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Gates, "Probable Cause,"
"Good Faith," and Beyond
Yale Kamisar*
Illinois v. Gates1 was the most eagerly awaited constitutional-criminal
procedure case of the 1982 Term. I think it fair to say, however, that
it was awaited a good deal more eagerly by law enforcement officials and
the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement than by defense lawyers
and the American Civil Liberties Union. As it turned out, of course, the
Gates Court, to the disappointment of many, did not reach the question
whether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases should be modified
so as not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment when it is obtained in the "good faith" belief or
"reasonable belief" that the challenged search or seizure was consistent
with the fourth amendment. 2 Nevertheless, the Gates decision is imporHenry K. Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1950, New
York University; LL.B. 1954, Columbia University; LL.D. 1978, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice (CUNY).
This Article grew out of the John F. Murray Lecture I delivered at the University
of Iowa College of Law on April 8, 1982. Because the lecture was given before the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), this Article
is more a replacement for, than a revision of, the April 1982 lecture. At several places
in the Article I have drawn freely on the remarks I made at the Fifth Annual Supreme
Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium on September 23-24, 1983. See 34
CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2081, 2098-2100 (Nov. 2, 1983).
I am greatly indebted to Thomas Y. Davies, Project Director of the American Bar
Foundation; Professor Wayne R. LaFave of the University of Illinois College of Law;
and Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,' for
allowing me to read, and profit by, drafts of their forthcoming articles on Gates and related
matters. I am also indebted to the many law professors who contributed significantly to
this Article by communicating with me about various underlying issues: Francis A. Allen,
Edward H. Cooper, Joseph D. Grano, Jerold H. Israel, Phillip E. Johnson, Wayne R.
LaFave, WaIde H. McCree, Jr., Silas J. Wasserstrom, and James B. White.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice
White wrote a long opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan (with whom
Justice Marshall joined) and Justice Stevens (with whom Justice Brennan joined) filed
separate dissents.
2. Although the "good faith" test is the popular name for the oft-proposed modification of the exclusionary rule, the Court did not use this term when it restored the Gates
case to the calendar for reargument. It requested the parties to address the question whether
the exclusionary rule "should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclitsion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure
at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 2321.
As this Article went to press, the Court had scheduled arguments in two new cases
raising the "good faith "-"reasonable belief" issue in the search warrant context:
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 3534 (1983); United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct.
*
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tant in its own right for it substantially dismantled the prevailing analytical
structure for determining probable cause-the so-called "two-pronged
test." 3
How much difference the Gates decision will make in the operation
of the warrant procedure, and whether it signals the abandonment of the
"two-pronged test" in warrantless as well as warrant cases, remains to
be seen. How Gates' soft standard for upholding search warrants (and
perhaps warrantless searches and seizures as well) will affect the proposal
to adopt a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" exception to the exclusionary rule also remains to be seen. I believe Gates has an important bearing on this issue. I think its emphasis on the practical, flexible, and fluid
nature of the "probable cause" standard substantially weakens the case
for a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" test generally. Moreover, I
think the Gates case totally obviates the need for such a test, if there ever
was one, in the warrant context. A "good faith" or "reasonable belief"
test by any other name is still a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" test,
and as I read Gates the Court essentially adopted such a test in the warrant context.
I.

ON THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF ILLINOIS V. GATES

Because the circumstances that gave rise to the search of the Gates
automobile are viewed so differently by various members of the Court,
and because I do not find the behavior of the Gates couple nearly as
"suspicious" or "unusual" as the Court and concurring Justice White
regard it, I think the facts are worth considering with some care.
A.

How Accurate Was the Letter Writer?

On May 3, 1978 the Bloomingdale (Illinois) Police Department received a handwritten letter by mail from an anonymous person. (The word
"anonymous" is used in different ways. The letter writer was not a person who was known to the police, but whose identity was withheld; rather,
this person was unknown even by the police.) The unknown person wrote:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town
who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue
and Lance Gates, they live [at a specified place]. Most of their
buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys
down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off

in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance
will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time
3535 (1983). A third case, raising the issue in a no-warrant situation, had been set for
argument but was dismissed when the defendant died: Colorado v. Quintero, cert. dismissed,

104 S. Ct. (1983).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 20-93.
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Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over
$100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00
worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make
their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a
big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who
4
visit their house often.
Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police Department decided to
pursue the tip. He learned that an "L. Gates" had made a reservation
on a May 5th flight to West Palm Beach. Drug agents later reported that
Mr. Gates flew to West Palm Beach as scheduled, took a taxi to a nearby
Holiday Inn, and went to a room registered to one Susan Gates. The
next morning, Gates and a woman (it turned out to be his wife) left the
motel and, to use the description contained in Detective Mader's affidavit,
drove "northbound on that interstate highway commonly used by travelers
to the Chicago area ' 5 (between twenty-two and twenty-four hours driving time away). At that point, when the Gates couple had just left the
West Palm Beach area, Detective Mader, setting forth the foregoing facts
in an affidavit, sought and obtained a warrant to search the Gates' Bloomingdale residence and their car.
Some thirty-six hours after he had flown out of Chicago, Gates and
his wife returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which
they had left West Palm Beach twenty-two hours earlier. The Bloomingdale
police were waiting for them. A search of the trunk of their car turned
up 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of their home produced more marijuana, as well as weapons and other contraband.
The Court did not dispute the Illinois courts' conclusion that, standing alone, the anonymous letter would not provide the basis for a
magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home. Nevertheless, applying
a "flexible," "practical, common-sense," "totality of the circumstances"
test (more about this later), the Court concluded that the corroboration
of the anonymous letter writer's predictions by independent police work
established the requisite "probable cause.' '6
In the course of its opinion, the Court observed that "[t]he letter
writer's accurate information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was

of a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves, or from
someone familiar with their . . . travel plans." ' 7 Despite what the Court
4. The letter is quoted in full in the opinion of the Court. 103 S. Ct. at 2325 (emphasis added).

5. 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 757, 403 N.E.2d 77, 82-83 (1980) (appendix).
6.
7.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2334-36.
Id. at 2335 (emphasis added).
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said or suggested, however, the letter writer did not prove to be completely accurate about the travel plans of each of the Gateses.
First, Sue Gates-who, by the way, for all the officers knew might
have been in Florida for a month before her husband joined her 8-did
not, as the letter writer predicted, "drop the car off" and "fly back"
alone. She drove back with her husband. This discrepancy is hardly a
quibble. As dissenting Justice Stevens pointed out, the discrepancy made
the Gates' behavior seem a good deal less unusual than, the informant
had predicted it would be.9 It would indeed have been odd if, as the
anonymous letter writer had predicted, Sue had driven to Florida, left
the car, and flown right back just before, or shortly after, her husband
arrived. But it is not unusual for a person to "fly to Florida, meet a waiting
spouse, and drive off together in the family car."' 1
Second, the letter writer had predicted an itinerary that always kept
one spouse home in Bloomingdale, which is understandable if "they have
over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement." But, as it turned
out, the couple was actually together over a thousand miles away from
home. This fact casts doubt on the hypothesis that they kept a large quantity
of drugs in their home and therefore did not want to leave it unguarded."
The Court also called attention to the corroboration of the letter's
prediction that a short time after flying to Florida, Lance would drive
the car north toward Bloomingdale.12 The letter writer, however, had
predicted that shortly after arriving in a Florida city, Lance would return
home by car, not simply drive the car in a northerly direction. The police
tried to bridge this gap by stating in their affidavit that the morning after
Lance arrived in West Palm Beach, the couple had set out upon "that
'13
interstate highway commonly used by travelers to the Chicago area.
The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, described the couple's departure in
almost identical fashion. 14 But as Justice Stevens noted, "the same highway
is also commonly used by travelers to Disney World, Sea World, and
Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus World. It is also the
road to Cocoa Beach, Cape Canaveral, and Washington, D.C."' 5
As it turned out, after the magistrate issued the warrant, the Gateses
did drive all night to Bloomingdale. And it is unusual for a couple to make
a twenty-two hour nonstop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida to Bloom8. See id. at 2360 n. I (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting). The anonymous
note stated that Sue Gates would drive down to Florida on May 3, several days before
her husband flew down. See id. at 2325.
9. See id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2360 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

11.
12.
13.
14.
used by
15.

See id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2335.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Gates and an unidentified woman "drove northbound on an interstate frequently
travelers to the Chicago area." 103 S.Ct. at 2326.
Id. at 2360 n.3 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
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ingdale, Illinois only a few hours after one spouse had flown to West Palm
Beach-but this fact was not known by the magistrate when he issued
the warrant. This unusual behavior, therefore, could not be considered
16
in evaluating the warrant.
Moreover, when Lance Gates made a reservation on a flight to West
17
Palm Beach, he used his own name and gave an accurate phone number.
Nor is there any indication that Lance did any of the things drug couriers
are supposed to do, or commonly do, such as pay for the plane ticket
in cash, carry no luggage, or improperly fill out baggage tags. 1 8 Thus,
Justice Stevens concluded, and Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed,
that the search warrant was invalid even under the Court's newly announced "totality of the circumstances" test.' 9 But I am getting ahead
of my story.
B.

The "Two-Pronged Test"

Applying the test that had governed these cases until the decision
in Gates, the so-called "two-pronged" Aguilar-Spinelli test, 20 three levels
of Illinois courts had concluded that the warrant was not based on probable
cause. 2' Now, what do I mean by the "two-pronged" Aguilar-Spinellitest?
A central proposition in warrant procedure is that the determination
of probable cause is to be made by the magistrate or another judicial officer,
not the law enforcement officer who seeks the warrant. To assure that
the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself between
the police and the citizenry, affidavits cannot be concusory. It is obviously
not enough simply to state: "affiant believes that probable cause exists
16.

InUnited States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), a case handed down a year after

the Illinois Supreme Court rendered its decision in Gates, the Court made it dear that
if the police have probable cause to believe a car contains contraband, they may carry
out a warrantless search of the entire vehicle, including the trunk and containers found
therein. Id. at 824-25. Thus, as dissenting Justice Stevens noted in Gates, 103 S.Ct. at
2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the car search may have been valid under Ross if the police
had probable cause after the Gateses returned home. Justice Stevens thought the preferable

resolution of Gates was to "simply vacate the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and
remand the case for reconsideration in the light of .. Ross." Id. at 2362 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

17.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

18. See id.(Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. See id.at 2361-62 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.at 2351 (Brennan, J., joined
by Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand, concurringJustice White concluded that
the search warrant was valid even under the pre-Gates "two-pronged test." See id. at 2347-50
(White, J., concurring).
20. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
21. The circuit judge of DuPage County quashed the search warrant and suppressed

the evidence seized pursuant toit, and all three judges of the Second District of the Illinois
Appellate Court, 82 111. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), and a 5-2 majority of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), agreed that the warrant
was not based on probable cause.
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to search [certain specified premises]." Nor is it enough to state that the
"affiant has received reliable information from a credible person and does
'22
believe that drugs are being kept at [certain premises]."
If the magistrate is to perform his detailed function and not be a rubber stamp, the affidavit must inform the magistrate of the underlying circumstances which led the officer to conclude that the informant was credible
and obtained the information in a reliable way. Only in this way, or so
the Court emphasized in Aguilar and Spinelli, can the magistrate make the
of the facts relied
properly independent judgment about the persuasiveness
23
upon by the officer to show probable cause.
These considerations gave rise to the two-pronged test: An affidavit
based on an informer's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable cause
for issuance of a warrant unless the affiant-officer states the reasons that
led him to conclude that the informant is probably credible or generally
trustworthy, or that the information is "reliable" on this particular occasion (the "veracity" prong) and unless the affiant states the reasons that
led him to conclude that the informer obtained the information in a reliable
way ("the basis of knowledge" prong).2 4 The two prongs or elements have
an independent status; they are analytically severable.2 5 The officer's oath
that the informant has often furnished reliable information in the past
establishes general trustworthiness, but it is still necessary that the "basis
of knowledge" prong be satisfied-the officer must explain how the informant claims to have come by the information in this case.
If the conclusory allegations of a police officer, presumably trustworthy
or personally known by the magistrate to be trustworthy, are insufficient
to establish probable cause, the conclusory allegations of a generally
trustworthy informant must be insufficient as well. If it is not enough for
an honest police officer to state a belief that gambling equipment or drugs
are located in a certain building without setting forth the reasons for this
22. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1933).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3(a) (1978); Moylan, Hearsayand Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer,
25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). Judge Moylan's oft-quoted opinion in Stanley v. State,
19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974), also is considered a leading discussion of the Aguilar-Spinellitest. The Gates majority seemed to consider the Stanley opinion
its prime exhibit of the unduly rigorous and excessively technical analysis of informants'
tips generated by the two-pronged test. See 103 S. Ct. at 2327 n.4, 2327-28 & n.5, 2329
n,8, 2331.
23. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 412-16; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; see also Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,
46 (1933).
24.
See W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(a), at 501-03; Moylan, supra note 22, at
747-52.
25. Justice Harlan, the author of Spinelli, underscored this point in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 592 (1971) (Harlan, J., joined by Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). See also Moylan, supra note 22, at 747-48.
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belief, it is not enough
for an honest informant simply to state the same
26
conclusory belief.

The converse is also true. Even if the informant states how he obtained the information which led him to conclude that gambling equipment is in a certain building, it is still necessary to establish the informant's "credibility" or general trustworthiness. The possibility remains
that the information might have been fabricated. The requirement that
the magistrate independently assess the general trustworthiness or honesty
of the informant does not vanish when the source of the tip indicates that
iftrue the information is trustworthy. 27 In short, under the two-pronged
test, a strong showing on one prong does not compensate for a deficient
showing on the other.
The most common way to satisfy the "veracity" prong is to point
to the informant's "track record"-he has provided accurate information to the police a number of times in the past. 28 If the informant's track
record cannot be sufficiently established, it may be possible to satisfy the
veracity prong by showing that the accusation was a declaration against
29
the informant's penal interest.
The surest way of satisfying the "basis of knowledge" prong is for
the informant to declare that he personally has seen the facts asserted and
is passing on first-hand information. 30 If the informant's information is
hearsay, he may establish good reason for believing it-for example, the
informant's hearsay comes from one of the participants
in the crime in
31
the nature of a declaration against interest.
The basis of knowledge prong also may be satisfied in an indirect
fashion. The tip may describe the suspect's criminal activity in such great
detail that the magistrate reasonably may conclude that the informant "is
relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating
in the underworld or an accusation based merely on [the suspect's] general
reputation.' '32 That is, the magistrate reasonably may infer that the informant gained the information in a reliable way. The "self-verifying
detail" approach does not have much to commend it, especially compared
to an explicit statement of the basis of the informant's knowledge. 33 In
any event, it should be utilized only with respect to the basis of knowledge

26. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 424
(White, J., concurring); see also Moylan, supra note 22, at 773.
27. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 592 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also infra text accompanying note 35.
28. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(a), at 502; Moylan, supra note 22, at 758-60.
29. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1971) (discussed in 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(a), at 522-35); see also Moylan, supra note 22, at 761-62.
30. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J., concurring).
31. See id. (White, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 416 (Harlan, J.); see also id. at 417; id. at 425 (White, J., concurring).
33. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(c), at 546-47.
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prong, not the veracity prong.3 4 As an oft-quoted Maryland court put
it in Stanley v. State:
[T]he "self-verifying detail" technique cannot repair a defect
in the "veracity" prong. The notion that great detail implies
personal observation rather than the overhearing of barroom
gossip, presupposes an honest informant. If the informant were
concocting a story out of the whole cloth, he could fabricate in
fine detail as easily as with rough brush strokes. Minute details
tell us nothing about "veracity."

'35

C. May Police Corroboration Overcome Deficiencies in Either or Both
"Prongs"?
If the veracity and basis of knowledge prongs are not satisfied in any
of the ways described above, is that the end of the story? Not at all, Justice
White tells us, in his self-styled "summary" of the Aguilar-Spinelli rules:
If a tip fails under either or both of the two prongs, probable cause
may yet be established by independent police investigatory work
that corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports "both
the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and
that he made his charge on the basis of information obtained
'36
in a reliable way."

Not so, say Professor Wayne LaFave and Judge Charles Moylan,
perhaps the two leading commentators on the law of search and seizure.
They maintain that the "corroboration" or "independent verification"
technique cannot repair a deficiency in the basis of knowledge prong, only
one in the veracity prong. 37 Nevertheless, I share Justice White's view
that independent police corroboration can "cure" a deficiency in either
or both prongs.
As LaFave himself observes, in Draperv. United States38 "the corroboration about which the Court spoke was used to overcome a deficiency with
39
respect to what later became [the] 'basis of knowledge' prong in Aguilar."
The AguilarCourt itself recognized at the outset that "an entirely different
case" would have been presented had the results of a police surveillance
of defendant's premises been added to the application for a search warrant. 40
34.

Id.

35. 19 Md. App. 507, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (Moylan, J.);
see also Moylan, supra note 22, at 780-81; Current Development, Probable Cause and the

First-Time Informer, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 362 (1972).
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417)
(emphasis added).
37. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 562-65 (quoting extensively from,
and relying heavily on, Judge Movlan's opinion in Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507,
531-32, 313 A.2d 847, 861-62 (C. Spec. App. 1974)); see also Moylan, supra note 22,

at 779-80.
38. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
39. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(a), at 506; see also id. § 3.3(f), at 552.
40. 378 U.S. at 109 n.1.
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This statement suggests-and Justice Harlan's "opinion of the Court" 41
in Spinelli dearly assumes-that independent investigative efforts may overcome deficiencies in either or both prongs:
If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. [The magistrate) must ask:
Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it
have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy
as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent
corroboration? . . .A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's
tip which-even when partially corroborated-is not as reliable
42
as one which passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone.
Professor LaFave is well aware that Justice Harlan's opinion in Spinelli
"suggest[s] that some greater degree of corroboration could have established
inferentially the requisite basis of knowledge. 43 He maintains, however,
that "there was not a fifth vote for this position.' '44 One response to
LaFave's contention is that, counting the three dissenters (Justices Black,
Stewart, and Fortas), who concluded that the corroboration of the tip did
establish the requisite basis of knowledge, 45 there were at least seven votes
for "this position." Indeed, dissenting Justice Fortas thought it plain that

41. Although Justice Harlan's opinion in Spinelli is designated as the "opinion of
the Court," it is unclear whether it is for the point under discussion. See infra text accompanying notes 44-54.
42. 393 U.S. at 415-16; see also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), in which
Justice Harlan, speaking for a 6-3 majority, observed:
This Court has held that where the initial impetus for an arrest is an informer's
tip, information gathered by the arresting officers can be used to sustain a finding of probable cause for an arrest that could not adequately be supported by
the tip alone [citing Draperand Spineih]. But the additional information acquired
by the arresting officers must in some sense be corroborative of the informer's
tip that the arrestees committed the felony or, as in Draperitself, were in the
process of committing the felony.
Id. at 567.
43. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, §3.3(f), at562. Iwouldputitmorestrongly.Justice
Harlan pointed out that "[t]he tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation," 393 U.S. at 416, but then addressed the question whether "the patent
doubts Aguilar raises as to the report's reliability are adequately resolved by a consideration of the allegations detailing the FBI's independent investigative efforts." Id. at 417.
But what would be the point of considering whether the FBI's independent investigative
efforts established that the informer "had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis
of information obtained in a reliable way," id., if the "independent verification" technique cannot repair a deficiency in the "basis of knowledge" prong?
44. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 562.
45. 393 U.S. at 430-31 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 438 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
"For substantially the reasons stated by my Brothers Black and Fortas," dissenting Justice
Stewart also thought the challenged warrant "was supported by a sufficient showing of
probable cause." Id. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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every one of the eight Justices who participated in the case 46 adhered to
"this position":
The majority acknowledges [that] its reference to a "two-pronged
test" should not be understood as meaning that an affidavit deficient in these respects is necessarily inadequate to support a search
warrant. Other facts and circumstances may be attested which
will supply the evidence of probable cause needed to support
the search warrant. On this general statement we are agreed. Our dif-

ference is that I believe such facts and circumstances are present in this47 case, and the majority arrives at the opposite
conclusion.

Professor LaFave's point, of course, is that although Justice White
concluded his separate opinion by "join[ing] the opinion of the Court
and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote [to uphold the search
warrant] would produce an equally divided Court," '48 he, in effect, re-

jected the view that a greater degree of independent verification could
have established inferentially the requisite basis of knowledge. As LaFave
read Justice White's Spinelli opinion when he published his treatise six
years ago 49 (and as Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gates, read White's Spinelli
opinion50 ), Justice White took the position that corroboration of certain
details in a tip could satisfy only the veracity, not the basis of knowledge
prong.
According to LaFave (and more recently, Justice Brennan), Justice
White, interpreting Draperquite differently than did Justice Harlan, viewed
the corroboration of Draper's arrival time, dress, and gait as satisfying
or reinforcing the informant's veracity, not his basis of knowledge. If sufficiently detailed, an "honest" informant's tip could "verify itself"-could
establish that the informant had acquired the information in a reliable
way-but corroboration of certain details in a tip could not accomplish
this verification.
It cannot be denied that this is a plausible way to read Justice White's
Spinelli opinion, 51 but it is not the only way. Justice White's main thrust
in Spinelli simply may have been to explore and to underscore "the tension" between Draper and the Aguilar-Spinelliline of cases. 52 He maintained,
for example, that although Justice Harlan "seemingly embrace[d]" Draper
in the course of invalidating the Spinelli search warrant, the Draperapproach,
if faithfully applied, would lead to the opposite result. 53 Nevertheless, in
46. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 420.
47. Id. at 438 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
49. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(o, at 562-63.
50. See 103 S. Ct. at 2353-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See 393 U.S. at 424-27 (White, J., concurring).

52.

See id. at 427-28 (White, J., concurring).

53.

Id. at 428-29 (White, J., concurring).
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the end, "[p]ending full-scale reconsideration of [Draper], on the one hand,
or of the Nathanson-Aguilarcases on the other," Justice White did "join
' 54
the opinion of the Court."

Whatever Justice White said (or meant to say) in his Spinelli
concurrence, 55 he now says:
I did not say that corroboration could never satisfy the basis of
knowledge prong. My concern was, and still is, that the prong
might be deemed satisfied on the basis of corroboration of information that does not in any way suggest that the informant had
an adequate basis of knowledge for his report. If, however, as
in Draper, the police corroborate information from which it can
be inferred that the informant's tip was grounded on inside information, this corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the basis of
knowledge prong. . . . The rules would indeed be strange if,
as Justice Brennan suggests, . . . the basis of knowledge prong

could be satisfied by detail in the tip alone, but not by independ56
ent police work.

Whatever Justice White meant in his Spinelli concurrence, I think
he was right when he said what he did in his Gates concurrence. The rules
would indeed be strange if a magistrate reasonably could infer from the
amount of detail in a wholly uncorroboratedtip that the informant had acquired
the information in a reliable way-that the informant was "relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation'" 5 7-but could not arrive at the same conclusion on the basis of independent police work that "developed significant corroboration or other
'probative indications of criminal activity along the lines suggested by the

informant.' "58 Police surveillance that uncovers suspicious activities along
the lines suggested by the tip would seem to provide "a basis for probable
cause far more solid than a routine recitation meeting the tests of
Aguilar" 59-let alone the "self-verifying detail" contained in a wholly uncorroborated tip.6o Indeed, it has been argued forcefully that police cor54. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
55.

As strange as this may seem, a Justice does not always have the last word on

what he believes he said (or meant) in an earlier case. For example, see justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 237-38 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting), explaining what he meant in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); and
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691-705 (1972)

(Brennan, J., dissenting), explaining what he meant in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967).
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 n.22 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
57. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
58. United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d 1224, 1231 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.)
(quoting Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Searchfor Meaningful
Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 716 (1972) (emphasis original)).
59. Id. at 1231.

60.

See supra text accompanying note 33.
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roboration of an undisclosed
informant's tip should be mandatory, not
6
merely "remedial."

1

The rules also would be strange, I think, if police corroboration of
an informant's story could remedy a deficiency in the veracity prong-no
Supreme Court opinion "question[s] such use of corroborating facts, and
rightly so' ' 62 -but not a deficiency in the basis of knowledge prong. Judge
64
Moylan 63 and Professor LaFave (relying heavily on Moylan's reasoning),
disagree. They believe that the different treatment of the two Aguilar prongs
makes good sense. Observes Judge Moylan:
Verifying the truth of part of a story does nothing either to ascertain the story's source or to check the informant's perhaps invalid conclusions ...
An informant who does not speak from personal knowledge
may well be passing on an amalgam of underworld rumor and
barroom gossip. If that be true the verification of one contributing
rumor would do nothing for the "veracity" of other contributing
rumors. An informant may have made, moreover, innocent
observations and then received incriminating information from
a third party lending inculpatory color to those observations.
Merely verifying the informant's innocuous observations does
nothing to verify the crucial third party who supplied the damning
catalyst.
An informant may, furthermore, be leaping to an erroneous
conclusion on the basis of innocent or ambiguous observations.
Independent verification of an ambiguous factual premise cannot allow an informant to draw an invalid conclusion therefrom.
The full premises must be set forth from which the judge may
construct his own ultimate syllogism. Even a "credible" informant may engage in bizarre flights of logic, which is precisely
and heard
why the judge must know just what the informant saw 65
and must not buy an informant's bare conclusions.
I readily agree that merely verifying one aspect of the informant's
story or merely corroborating a few "innocuous details"-that is, commonly known facts or easily predictable events such as the identify of the
suspect's girl friend, the make and color of his car and its license plate
number, the number of his home phone, and the bar he frequently
61. Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the FourthAmendment: A Searchfor Meaningful
Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 715-17 & n.69 (1972).
62. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 556.
63.

See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 562-63. Professor LaFave points out,
however, that "the prevailing view is to the contrary." Id. at 563.
65. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 531-32, 313 A.2d 847, 861-62 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1974), quoted with approval in 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(o, at 563; see
also Moylan, supra note 22, at 779-80.

64.
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visits 66-would

not (at least, should not) suffice to remedy a deficiency

in the basis of knowledge element. But such minimal corroboration would
67
not (or should not) remedy a deficiency in the veracity prong either.
What, however, if independent police work has developed "significant corroboration or other 'probativeindicationsof criminalactivity along the
lines suggested by the informant,' "68 or strongly indicates that the infor-

mant possesses "a knowledge of the inner workings of the [suspects']
system, ' 69 or indicates that the informant has "some personal pipeline
to the suspect's scheme, rather than 'public' information available to the
world at large"? 70 To be sure, the risk that the informant is (to use Judge
Moylan's language) passing on "underworld rumor" or "barroom gossip"
or engaging in "bizarre flights of logic" cannot be wholly eliminated by
independent verification, but why does it have to be? Both Professor LaFave
and Judge Moylan agree that independent verification of an undisclosed
informant's tip can remedy a deficiency in the veracity prong,7 ' but the
risk that the informant is lying cannot be-and need not be-wholly
eliminated. It is enough that the risk "has been sufficiently reduced by corroborative facts and observations."7 Why, then, cannot the risk that the
informant is merely relying on "a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general
reputation ' 73 be sufficiently reduced by the same method?
What does it mean to say that the independent verification technique
cannot repair a defect in the basis of knowledge prong? One would think
66. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1271-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J., dissenting); United States v. Myers, 538 F.2d 424, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting); Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the FourthAmendment: A Searchfor Meaningful

Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 715-20 (1972); cf. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 414 (Defendant's "travels
to and from the apartment building and his entry into a particular apartment on one

occasion could hardly be taken as bespeaking gambling activity; and there is surely nothing
unusual about an apartment containing two separate telephones.").

67. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 560.
Corroboration of the innocent detail does not negate the possibility that the informer is lying about other incriminating facts, for a clever informer wishing
to harass an innocent person by a police search might lace his report with detail
about the other's activities to give the report an appearance of credibility.
Current Development, Probable Cause and the First-Time Informer, 43 U. COLO. L. REV.
357, 362 (1972); see also Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Causefor Search or Arrest, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 958, 967 (1969).
68. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting).

71. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supranote 22, § 3.3(f), at 556-61; Moylan, supra note 22, at
777-78, 779.
72. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 557 (quoting Comment, Informer's Word
as the Basisfor Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 840, 842 (1965)) (emphasis added).

73.

Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416.
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it means that no amount of corroboration 74 can cure this defect in the
informant's story-that a tip suffering from such a defect and police observations insufficient in themselves to show probable cause cannot add up
to probable cause. But this is not so, 75 and Professor LaFave concedes
that it is not 76-but he does so most begrudgingly.

If police observations fall short of demonstrating probable cause in
and of themselves but give rise to a "strong suspicion" of criminal activity,
LaFave observes that the inadequate tip "may be taken into account"
to raise the police observations to the level of probable cause. 77 But in
such instances, cautions LaFave, the police observations do not "bridge
the gap" between the inadequate informant's tip and probable cause;
rather, it is the imperfect tip that "bridges the gap" between the police
observations and probable cause. 78 LaFave recognizes that the result in
a particular case may be the same whether one views the independent
police work as supplementing or corroborating a tip lacking an adequate
showing on the basis of knowledge or whether (as he does) one views the
inadequate tip as supplementing or corroborating the police observations
stimulated by the tip, 79 but, he maintains, "more is involved here than
a matter of semantics." ' 80 I wonder.

Suppose that when Lance Gates flew to West Palm Beach drug agents
saw four men, two of whom the agents knew from past experience to be
narcotics dealers, meet him at the airport. Or suppose that shortly after
arriving at the West Palm Beach Holiday Inn, Lance and his wife had
dinner at a nearby restaurant with four men, two of whom drug agents
knew to be narcotics dealers. Merely meeting or talking to known narcotics dealers hardly makes it probable that the suspect is engaged in the
narcotics traffic. In Sibron v. New York 8' an officer saw the defendant "talking to a number of known narcotics addicts over a period of eight hours,' '82
but the Court concluded that these observations produced "[n]othing
resembling probable cause.' '83 Indeed, concurring Justice Harlan maintained that "association with known criminals ...does not, entirely by
itself, create suspicion adequate to support a stop. ' ' 84 I think few would
74. "No amount of corroboration" means information that is short of police observations sufficient in themselves to establish probable cause. When this point is reached,
the independent police work ha!3 developed beyond mere corroboration to a showing of
probable cause entirely apart from the informant's tip and the tip becomes a redundancy.
See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 566; Moylan, supra note 22, at 778.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See I W. LAFAVE, supta note 22, § 3.3(f), at 566-70.
See id. at 566.
See id. at 566-67.
See id. at 569.
This is my language, not LaFave's, but I think it is a fair description of his analysis.
1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 567-68.

81.
82.
83.

392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Id. at 62.
Id. In Sibron the police did not overhear the conversations or see anything pass

between the defendant and the known addicts. This is also true of the cases I pose.
84. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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deny, however, that allegations in the application for the search warrant
that drug agents had seen Lance Gates consorting with drug dealers at
the airport or at a restaurant, when combined with the statements contained in the anonymous tip, would add up to probable cause that Lance
had traveled to West Palm Beach to "make a buy."
In the cases hypothesized above, it does matter that the police did
not merely corroborate a few innocuous details unrelated to the criminal
scheme, but significantly corroborated the suspect's criminal activity along
the lines suggested by the tip. Why, however, does it matter whether the
police observations raised the tip to the level of probable cause or whether
the tip raised the police observations to the requisite level? I prefer to
ask the question the way Justice Harlan did in Spinelli: "Can it fairly be
said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated
by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's
tests without independent corroboration?" 8 Do the facts and circumstances
developed by independent police work "permit the suspicions engendered
by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being committed' '?86 At one point, Justice Harlan did describe the
government's claim alternatively:
[F]ollowing the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the Government claims that the informant's tip gives a suspicious color to
the FBI's reports detailing Spinelli's innocent-seeming conduct
and that, conversely, the FBI's surveillance corroborates the in87
formant's tip, thereby entitling it to more weight.
But all this proves, I think, is that insisting that police corroboration cannot repair a deficiency in the basis of knowledge prong, but conceding
that the deficient tip can raise the facts and circumstances uncovered by
the police to the level of probable cause, is a matter of semantics.
Let us forget about hypothetical corroboration of the anonymous letter
and look at the Gates facts themselves. The Gates dissenting Justices (Brennan, joined by Marshall, and Stevens, joined by Brennan) had no quarrel with the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that the anonymous letter
satisfied neither the basis of knowledge nor the veracity prong. Indeed,
the Gates dissenters maintained that the warrant was invalid even under
the Court's newly announced and less rigorous "totality of the circumstances" test.8 8 Justice Stevens recognized, however, that the twentytwo hour nonstop drive from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale, "only
a few hours after Lance had flown to Florida"-a fact not known to the
magistrate when he issued the search warrant-'"provided persuasive
evidence that [the Gateses] were engaged in illicit activity. "89 Thus Justice
85.

393 U.S. at 415; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.

86. 393 U.S. at 418.
87. Id. at 415.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2361-62 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2351 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
89. Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens would have vacated the judgment and remanded the case to consider whether, .in light of Ross, the police had probable cause to make a
warrantless search of the car after the Gateses returned to Bloomingdale.9"
Why did justice Brennan join the Stevens opinion? The two-pronged
test applied to warrantless searches as well as to those conducted pursuant
to a warrant. 9' If the anonymous letter failed to satisfy the basis of
knowledge prong and if, as Justice Brennan maintained, "corroboration
of certain details in a tip" could not overcome a defect in the basis of
knowledge prong, 92 what would be the point of remanding the case to
ascertain whether the police had probable cause to conduct a car search
after the Gateses returned home?
When viewed in isolation-that is, entirely apart from the statements
contained in the anonymous letter-the Gates couple's itinerary (including
the nonstop drive back to Bloomingdale) fell short of probable cause, and
by more than a "little bit.' 93 How, then, could a tip that lacked an adequate showing of the basis of knowledge and the corroborating facts (including the Gates' nonstop drive home)-insufficient in themselves to
establish probable cause-add up to probable cause?
D.

The Illinois Supreme Court's Application of the Aguilar-Spinelli Test

Citing the writings of Professor LaFave and Judge Moylan, the Illinois
Supreme Court observed that the courts "are not in agreement on the
question of whether partial corroboration, combined with an informant's
tip, may cure a deficiency in either prong of the Aguilartest.'' 9' But LaFave
and Moylan are emphatic that police corroboration may cure a deficiency
in the veracity prong. 95 These two commentators do balk at the notion
that police corroboration may remedy a deficiency in the basis of knowledge
prong, but LaFave recognizes that "the prevailing view is to the
contrary.' '96 Indeed, although LaFave supports Judge Moylan's reasoning in Stanley v. State,9 7 he calls the Stanley case "unique for its rejection"
of the view that "a basis of knowledge defect can be remedied by partial
corroboration.'"98

90.

Id. at 2362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

91.

See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, §3.3(a), at501; Moylan, supra note 22, at 752-54.

92.

"Spinelli stands for the proposition that corroboration of certain details in a tip

may be sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar."
103 S. Ct. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Cf I W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 566 (informant's story, although
lacking basis of knowledge, may supply "little bit more" needed to elevate other informa-

tion to level of probable cause).
94.
95.
96.
97.

85 I1. 2d at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 561-62; Moylan, supra note 22, at 758.
1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 3.3(f), at 563.
See id. at 562-63.

98. Id. at 562.
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Moreover, as pointed out in the previous section, LaFave
acknowledges that in some instances a defective tip may raise police observations of suspicious behavior to the level of probable cause. 99 At least
when police corroboration constitutes what might be called the "dominant element" of probable cause-arguably the situation in Gates-that
corroboration (although insufficient in itself to permit a search) when
coupled with the imperfect tip can add up to probable cause. 100
The Illinois Supreme Court saw no need to resolve the question
whether partial corroboration could remedy deficiencies in either or both
prongs of the Aguilar test since "the nature of the corroborating 'evidence'
in this case would satisfy neither [prong]." 10 1 Why not? Because "the
corroborative evidence here was only of clearly innocent activity" and
the corroboration of such activity "is insufficient to support a finding of
10 3
probable cause" 0 2-citing, and citing only, Whiteey v. Warden.
"Innocent" or "clearly innocent" activity is an elusive term infused
with several meanings. The corroboration of "public or innocuous facts' 04
(for example, the kind of car the suspect drives, an apartment number,
or a phone number) only "shows that the informer has some familiarity
with the suspect's affairs." 1 0 5 Such corroboration only justifies an inference
that the informant is "not a total liar," ' 10 6 not that criminal activity may
be afoot. Corroboration of the details in the informant's report is significant only to the extent that it tends to give substance and verity to the
report that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity; the informant's
"reliability as a describer in the abstract . . . is really not what Spinelli
10 7
and Aguilar are concerned with."
The Whiteley case does not, as the Illinois Supreme Court apparently
thought, stand for the proposition that corroboration of "innocent activity"
cannot bolster an inadequate tip. Whiteley tells us only that the verification of "innocent activity" that does not tend to confirm criminal activity
along the lines suggested by the tip cannot bolster an inadequate tip. Whiteey
tells us that information independently obtained by the police "can be used
to sustain a finding of probable cause for an arrest that could not adequately be supported by the tip alone," ' 1 but in order to do so the police99. See supra text accompanying notes 74-87.
100. See id.
101. 85 Il. 2d at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893 (emphasis added).
102. Id., 423 N.E.2d at 893.
103. 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971).
104. United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting).
105. Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Causefor Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
958, 967 (1969).
106. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 181 (1969).
107. United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J.,

dissenting).
108.

401 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
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obtained information "must in some sense be corroborative of the informer's tip that the arrestees committed the felony or... were in the process of
committing the felony." 109
The information obtained by the police in Whiteley failed to clear even
this low hurdle, but the information gathered by the police in Gates surely
did clear the hurdle. In Whiteley, "the very most" the police-obtained information "tended to establish" was that the informant "knew [the
suspects] and the kind of car they drove." 10 In Gates, on the other hand,
although the anonymous letter writer proved to be inaccurate in one important respect (Sue Gates did not drop off the car in Florida and fly back
alone"'), the story "had been corroborated in major part by [Detective]
112
Mader's efforts."
In Gates the facts obtained through the independent investigation of
Mader may have been "intrinsically innocent, "113 but they were hardly
"innocuous." They "at least suggested that the Gates were involved in
drug trafficking. 1 1 4 In Whiteley there was no nexus between the corroborated details and the alleged crime; in Gates there certainly was.
Suppose Detective Mader had verified the informant's report in every
essential respect. Suppose that (1) Sue Gates had driven to West Palm
Beach, dropped off the car, and flown back to Illinois a few hours before
her husband boarded a plane for Florida and then (2) the morning after
he had arrived in West Palm Beach Lance made a twenty-two hour nonstop
drive back home, and that all this had been known to the magistrate before
he issued the warrant. Would probable cause to search have been
established under the Aguilar-Spinellitest? Very few, I think, would answer
in the negative. (I certainly would not.) If the anonymous letter writer's
report were as impressively corroborated as hypothesized above, surely
the corroborated tip would have been "as trustworthy as a tip which would
5
pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration.""
But how would the Illinois Supreme Court have responded to the
hypothetical posed above? The Illinois Supreme Court's discussion of "the
corroboration of innocent activity" is so cryptic in Gates that one cannot
answer this question with any assurance. Although I find much to quarrel
with in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gates, I agree that "[i]n making
a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts."" 6 The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, seemed so "hung up over the fact that the details of the
109.
110.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

111.
112.
113.

See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
Cf United States ex rel. Cunningham v. Follette, 397 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir.

1969) (Feinberg, J.) (nothing "intrinsically suspicious" about defendant's act).
114. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
115. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13.
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informant's story that had been verified had all been innocent details ' 117
that there is reason to think that even on the facts supposed above, it still
would have balked at finding probable cause.
E.

The Gates "Totality of the Circumstances" Test: Does It Raise Some of
the Same Problems Generated by the Pre-Miranda "Voluntariness'" Test?

Even on the basis of the facts actually presented to the magistrate,
concurring Justice White thought the results of the police investigation
of the Gateses permitted the suspicion engendered by the informant's letter
C 'to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being
committed.' "118 And, unlike the majority, Justice White did not discard,
but rather applied the two-pronged Aguilar test. 119 He thought the behavior
of the Gateses was sufficiently "suspicious" to give rise to an inference
that the informant was credible and had obtained the information in a
reliable way.
But the Court, perJustice Rehnquist, was not interested in working
out an answer under the two-pronged test. It thought it "wiser to abandon the existing probable cause structure ' 120 in favor of a "totality of
the circumstances" analysis that downgrades the veracity and basis of
knowledge elements and makes them only "relevant considerations." 121
Under the totality of circumstances approach, "[t]he task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision, whether
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the

'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
1 22
will be found in a particular place.'

The task of a reviewing court, the Gates majority makes plain, is even
more modest-" simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantialbasis
for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. '
117.

123

In other words,

Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Did and What It Did Not Do, 20 CRIM. L. BULL.

93, 105 (1984).
118. 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 418).
119. See id. at 2347-50 (White, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2332.
121. Id. at 2329. Earlier in its opinion, the Court "agree[d] with the Illinois Supreme
Court that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his report." Id. at 2327. But it disagreed that "these

elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be
rigidly exacted in every case, which the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would

imply." Id. at 2327-28. Rather, these elements "should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether
there is 'probable cause.' "Id. at 2328. At another point, the Court observed that "[u]nlike
a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the relative
weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's
tip, the 'two-pronged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips." Id. at 2330 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 2332 (emphasis added).
123. Id. (quotingJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)) (emphasis added).
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the warrant is to be upheld as long as there is a "substantial basis" for
a "fair probability" that evidence will be found in a particular case. Not
much, is it?
This "flexible, easily applied standard," the Court assured us, "will
better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the
24
Fourth Amendment requires than does [the two-pronged approach]."1
How flexible, and how wide-ranging this test will be remains to be seen.
The totality of circumstances approach does not limit what circumstances
are to be considered relevant. It has been suggested, for example, that
the next step may be that the requisite degree of probability should depend on the circumstances of the severity of the crime being investigated
1 25
and the intensity of the privacy interest being invaded.
True, under the Gates approach the magistrate is supposed to take
into account the veracity and basis of knowledge elements, along with
other factors. It is also true, however, that in pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda
days when the "flexible"-I would say amorphous, elusive, and largely
unreviewable 126 - ' totality of the circumstances" -"voluntariness" test
prevailed, the courts were supposed to take into account the failure to
advise a suspect of his rights, the denial of a request to contact an attorney, refusal to permit communications with friends, and the duration
and conditions of detention127-indeed, "all the circumstances attendant
upon the confession.' 1 28 Almost everything was relevant, but almost
nothing was decisive. "Apart from direct physical coercion ... no single
default or fixed combination of defaults guaranteed exclusion . . 129
We now know, however, that in applying the totality of the circumstances test for the admissibility of confessions the courts did notand did not have to-take the aforementioned factors into account very
124.
125.

Id.
See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV.L. REv. 70, 184 n.60 (1983).

126.

See Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS-ESSAYS IN LAW

AND POLICY 43-44, 64-76 (1980); see also Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review),
79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867-71 (1981).
127. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
128. "In resolving the issue [of the 'voluntariness' of a confession] all the circumstances
attendant upon the confession must be taken into account." Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,
440 (1961); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Court,
looking back on its 30 pre-Escobedo fourteenth amendment due process confession cases,
recalled:
The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on
the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion .... While the state
of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his
rights, were certainly factor. to be evaluated in assessing the "voluntariness"
of an accused's responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.
Id. at 226-27.
129. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 508 (1966) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart
and White, JJ., dissenting).
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much. We now know too that Supreme Court "voluntary" confession
cases "[c]ountenancing quite significant pressures can be cited without
' 130
difficulty, and the lower courts may often have been yet more tolerant.
In other words, the "fluid" and "flexible" totality of the circumstancesvoluntariness test accommodated law enforcement interests to a much
greater extent than it accommodated what the Gates majority called "private

interests. "131
At one point the Gates majority declined to decide whether the affidavit
submitted to the magistrate in the Spinelli case would have passed muster
under its new totality of the circumstances test. It "would not be profitable" to decide this question, observed the Court, because "[t]here are
so many variables in the probable cause equation that one determination
will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another. ' 132 Reading this statement made me wince-for this, of course, was the very problem with the
pre-Escobedo, pre-Mirandatest for the admissibility of confessions. Because
there were so many variables in the "voluntariness equation" that one
determination that a confession was "voluntary" seldom served (to borrow
the Gates Court's language) as "a useful 'precedent' for another," the
test left police interrogators and trial courts with little, if any, guidanceindeed, "virtually invited" trial courts "to give weight to their.subjective
preferences' '133 and "discouraged active review even by the most con134
scientious appellate judges."
F.

How Persuasive Are the Reasons Given for Abandoning the "TwoPronged Test"?

What reasons did the Gates Court give for abandoning the approach
that had been utilized for the previous decade and a half? Probable cause
was said to be "a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities
in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules." 135 But it hardly can be said that the two-pronged
test had reduced probable cause to "a neat set of legal rules." And the
test did provide a framework-a structure-for probable cause inquiries
that still allowed sufficient room for application of common sense and assess130.

Id. at 509 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)..
Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESsION-EssAYs IN
13-14, 27-34, 69-76 (1980); Amsterdam, TheSupreme Court andtheRights
of Suspects in CriminalCases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785,806,809 (1970); Herman, The Supreme
Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 456 nn.36-39 (1964);
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MICH.L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1981);
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 102-03.
132. 103 S. Ct. at 2332 n.11.
133. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 870
(1981).
134. Id.
135. 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
131.
See, e.g.,
LAW AND POLICY
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ment of the particular facts of the particular case. 3 6 If, as the Court claimed,
some lower court decisions reflected an unduly rigid application of the
test, the Court could have disapproved such an approach; it need not have
1 37
dismantled the test's basic structure.
Another reason advanced by the Court for abandoning the twopronged test was that affidavits " 'are normally drafted by nonlawyers
in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation' "138 and that warrants
"long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges." 139
But this point seems to cut the other way. Because nonlawyers are so often
involved in the initial probable cause determination, there is a need for
a test that provides more guidance than a totality of circumstances approach. As dissenting Justice Brennan pointed out, the two-pronged standard "help[ed] to structure probable cause inquiries." 140 By stressing the
independent importance of the veracity and basis of knowledge elements
and by identifying various ways in which each requirement could be
satisfied, the now discarded test provided laypersons, police, and magistrates
with a useful framework within which to operate. By toppling this structure, the Court has increased the risk that probable cause determinations
will be based more on the predilections of those in the front lines and
14
less on established principles. 1
As for the Gates Court's point that "after-the-fact scrutiny by courts
of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
review,"1 42 it never did-at least it was not supposed to-under the AguilarSpinelli approach, and both cases said as much. 43 Still another reason given
by the Court for adopting the totality of circumstances test was the fear
that if affidavits are subjected to greater scrutiny the "police might well
resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some
other exception to the warrant clause that might develop at the time of
the search."' 144 But the Court has long expressed a strong preference for
the warrant procedure (although it must be said that too often it has not
practiced what it has preached) and in the oft-quoted 1965 Ventresca case
it maintained that "when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
1 45
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.'
136.

See id. at 2357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also LaFave, Fourth Amendment

Vagaries (of ImprobableCause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and BalancingAskew),
74 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983).

137.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 & n.26 (White, J., concurring); see also LaFave, supra

note 136, at

-

n.102.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

103 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
Id.
Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring); see also LaFave, supra note 136, at __.
103 S. Ct. at 2331.
See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111.
103 S. Ct. at 2331.

145.

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
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Moreover, if the Court truly is concerned that the police are avoiding,
or may too readily avoid, the search warrant route, it must be said that
it has manifested this anxiety in strange ways. For example, in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte,14 6 probably the most important "consent search" case decided
to date, the Court, as the usually restrained language of the commentary
it, drove "an enorto the Model Code of Pre-ArraignmentProceduredescribed
14 7
mous hole through the warrant requirement. '

As the Gates majority itself suggests, 148 the easiest and most propitious
way for the police to avoid the warrant procedure (and the other problems presented by the fourth amendment) is to obtain a "consent" to
what otherwise would be an illegal search or seizure. As a practical matter, therefore, the potency of the warrant requirement (and the scope of
the protection furnished by the fourth amendment generally) varies greatly
depending upon how easy or difficult it is for the government to establish
consent. Ten years ago in Schneckloth, the Court made it easy. (And all
four members of the Gates majority who also sat on the Court ten years
ago joined the Schneckloth opinion. 149)
Schneckloth tells us that when the government seeks to justify a search
on consent grounds, it need not demonstrate a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of fourth amendment rights-this strict standard of waiver is reserved for those rights designed to preserve a fair trial.150 The government need demonstrate only that the consent to an otherwise impermissible search "was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied. ' 15 1 According to Schneckloth, then, a person may effectively consent to a search even though he was never
informed-and the government has failed to establish that he was aware-of
the right to refuse the officer's "request." One need not be protected from
loss by ignorance or confusion, only from loss through coercion. 5 2 After
Schneckloth, the criminal justice system, in some important respects at least,
can (to borrow a phase from Escobedo) "depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.' '153
Nor is this all. Aside from consent searches (if that is considered an
146.

412 U.S. 218 (1973).

147.

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS

240.2 commentary at

537 (1975).

148. See supra text accompanying note 144.
149. Although he joined Justice Stewart's opinion of the Court in Schnecklolh, Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, also wrote a concurring
opinion. 412 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring). Although he, too, joined in the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun also wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 249

(Blackmun, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 236-46.
151. Id. at 248.
152. See id. at 231-33, 248-49.
153. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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exception), the largest single exception to the warrant clause is the search
incident to a lawful arrest. This exception alone "outnumber[s] manyfold
searches covered by warrants." 5 4 But in New York v. Belton 155 the Court
greatly broadened the "search incident" exception (at least in automobile
settings). 56 (Again, all four members of the Gates majority who also sat
on the Court two years ago joined the Belton opinion. 157) Whether or not
there is probable cause to believe a car contains evidence of crime, as
long as there are sufficient grounds to make a lawful "custodial arrest"
of the vehicle's occupants-even though the occupants are handcuffed,
standing outside the car, and surrounded by officers-Belton holds that
the police may conduct a warrantless search of the entire "interior" or
"passenger compartment" of the car (including closed containers found
58
within that zone).'
Nor is this all. Another major exception to the warrant requirement
is the Carroll doctrine, 5 9 often called the "automobile exception." 1 60 As
it was originally understood, and for most of its life, the Carrolldoctrine
permitted police to search a car without a warrant only when there were
both (1) probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of crime
and (2) "exigent circumstances" that made it impractical to obtain a
warrant.' 6' In the 1970's, however, the Court significantly expanded the
doctrine by virtually eliminating the "exigent circumstances"
154.

T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 48 (1969).

155.
156.

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
For a close examination of Belton, see Kamisar, The "Automobile &arch" Cases:

The Court Does Little to Clarify the "'Labyrinth" of Judicial Uncertainty, in J. CHOPER, Y.
& L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-81, at
69, 87-100 (1982).
157. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's opinion of the Court, but also wrote
a brief concurring opinion. 453 U.S. at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
158. See Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the
"Labyrinth" ofJudicial Uncertainty, inJ. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR &L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-81, at 69, 89-92 (1982). As concurringJustice
Stevens emphasized, Belton not only permits vehicle searches in the absence of a warrant,
but also in the absence of probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of crime. Thus, warned Justice Stevens, an arresting officer may find reason
to take a minor offender into custody "whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase
or package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens concurred in Belton
for the reasons stated in his dissent in Robbins. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
KAMISAR

159.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

160. I share Judge Moylan's view that the "automobile exception" is a sloppy term
for the Carrolldoctrine, because many valid warrantless searches are not based on this
doctrine at all, but rather on some other exception to the warrant requirement-e.g.,

"searches incident to arrest" or "inventory searches." See Moylan, The Automobile Excep-

tion: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in &arch of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER
L. REV. 987, 1012-15 (1976).
161.

See Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the

"Labyrinth" ofJudicial Uncertainty, inJ. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-81, at 69, 71-72 (1982).
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requirement. 162 As a result, the doctrine essentially became a "probable
cause" exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles. 163 Then,
in the 1982 Ross case, 164 the Court further extended the Carrolldoctrineand dramatized its potency-by utilizing it to uphold the warrantless search
of a "movable container" found in a locked car trunk.165 (The five Justices
who made up the Gates majority all joined the Ross opinion. 166)
In light of such cases as Schneckloth, Belton, and Ross, 167 it is hard to
take seriously the Gates majority's expression of concern that if the twopronged test were not abandoned, "the police might well resort to warrantless searches." 168 The Court (and, more specifically, most of the Justices
who made up the Gates majority), it does not seem unfair to say, has already
given the police all the encouragement they need in this regard.
To return to the Gates case, still another reason the Court offered
in defense of its totality of the circumstances approach was the view that
anonymous tips, "particularly when supplemented by independent police
investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect
crimes,' '169 yet the Aguilar-Spinelli standard "leaves virtually no place
for anonymous citizen informants."170 As a leading authority on the law
of search and seizure has retorted, however, "[i]t is not a matter of no
place or a place, but rather of exactly what [the place of the anonymous
informant] should be."' 1 7 1 Unless it can be shown that the tip came from
an honest or reliable person who acquired the information in the particular
case in a reliable way-and there is "no basis for treating anonymous
informants as presumptively reliable" nor "for assuming that the information [they provide] has been obtained in a reliable way"1 72 -an arrest
or search should not be permitted on the basis of the tip. It is worth recalling, as former Justice Potter Stewart has recently observed: "The inevitable
result of the Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon prob162.

See id. at 74-80.

163.

See id.

164.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

165.

But the Ross Court reaffirmed the rule that despite probable cause to believe

that they contain evidence of crime, movable dosed containers located in a public place
(for example, a bus depot) ordinarily may not be opened and searched without a warrant.
See id. at 809-12.
166.

ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor

joined Justice Stevens' opinion of the Court, but Justices Blackmun and Powell also wrote
brief concurring opinions. Id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 826 (Powell, J.,
concurring).

167.

See also Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480-81 (1983) (extending the

protective search concept of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to vehicles). The Long

case is closely examined and strongly criticized in LaFave, supra note 136, at
168. See supra text accompanying note 144.
169. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
LaFave, supra note 136, at -.
103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 69 Iowa L. Rev. 575 1983-1984

69 IOWA LAWREVIEW

551

[1984]

able cause is that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer
17 3

criminals.'"
Of course, if the anonymous tip is sufficiently supplemented by independent police investigation, then the police are permitted to make a
search or seizure. The police need not observe criminal behaviorinformation that significantly corroborates the informer's tip that the suspect
is engaged in criminal activity along certain lines may suffice. 174 Moreover,
even if a tip, standing along or partially corroborated, does fall short of
probable cause it still has a place in law enforcement-it still may contribute to the solution of crime-by prompting"a police investigation, or
further investigatory work, that does establish that requisite probable cause.
In this regard, it is worth recalling what the anonymous letter said:
"I guarantee ifyou watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They
5
are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often. "'17
Out
of the mouths of babes and anonymous informants sometimes comes
wisdom. As the anonymous letter suggested, more patience might have
enabled the police not only to satisfy the two-pronged test with respect
to the Gates couple, but also to apprehend some of those "big drugs
dealers" as well.
"The strictures that inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged test'
did impede the task of the Bloomingdale police, but only because they
terminated their pursuit of the tip when they did.' 76 But what compelled
them to quit at the point they did? Why was it necessary for Detective
Mader to make his move (that is, to apply for a search warrant) the moment the Gates couple left the West Palm Beach Holiday Inn and "drove
northbound on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago
area"? 177 As Professor LaFave has pointed out:
Because the letter alleged an ongoing criminal scheme which was
unlikely to terminate and which involved not only repeated travels
by the two suspects but also recurrent visits to their house by
drug dealers, the police were hardly confronted with a "now
or never" kind of situation. Numerous avenues of investigation
78
were open to them.
173. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
The exclusionary rule, to be sure, has caught heavy fire for this state of affairs, but again

to quote Justice Stewart: "[This criticism is properly reserved for the fourth amendment.
The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. The fourth amend-

rnent does." Id.
174.

80-93.
175.
176.

See supra text accompanying notes 108-17; see also supra text accompanying notes

Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325 (emphasis added).
Cf id. at 2331 ("The strictures that inevitably accompany the 'tvo-pronged test'

cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement ... .
177. Id. at 2326.
178. LaFave, supra note 136, at -.
For example, the police might have waited to
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One might retort, of course, that Gales grew out of an atypical situation and that the peculiar facts of this case do not discredit the general
proposition that "[t]he strictures that inevitably accompany the 'twopronged test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law
enforcement. "179 But the Gates Court cited only three state appellate decisions for this sweeping statement. 180 To point to the overly rigid application of a rule in a few instances, however, is scant justification for abandoning the rule itself. If it were sufficient justification, then neither the
parol evidence rule, nor the hearsay rule, nor any other familiar rule could
withstand attack.
The Gates majority's impression or assumption that the Aguilar-Spinelli
standard is bound to "seriously impede" police work bears little, if any,
resemblance to the picture that emerges from the National Center for State
Courts' (NCSC) recently completed study of the operation of the warrant
process in seven cities.' 8' As Thomas Y. Davies, Project Director of the
American Bar Foundation, says of this study in a recent article:
[A]lthough the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements were in effect during the entire period of the warrant process study, that study
reports no evidence that they imposed any practical obstacle for
warrant applications. To the contrary, the warrant process study
found that most of these warrant applications contained
boilerplate allegations written to meet Aguilar-Spinelli, that warrant applications were seldom rejected for this reason (or any
other reason), and that warrant searches were seldom the subject of successful motions to suppress (for this reason or any other
reason). Indeed, the warrant process study reports that a number
of trial judges interviewed who had experience with warrant applications expressed fears that the alleged informant informa82
tion was "manufactured"

by the police.1

see how soon the Gates couple would return to Florida a second time ("[m]ost of their
buys are done in Florida"), or they might have put the Gates house under surveillance

("drugs dealers .. .visit their house often"), or they might have ascertained whether
either Lance or Sue held a job (they "strictly make their living on selling drugs"; "[t]hey
brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers").
179. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
180. See id. at 2330 n.9. Of course, as pointed out in LaFave, supra note 136, at
n. 102, there is no shortage of opinions applying the Aguilar-Spinelli standard too loosely.
See also infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
181. See R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The Search Warrant Process:
Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices (National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg,

Va., 1983) (draft report) (on file in the University of Iowa and University of Michigan
law libraries). In order to protect those wishing to remain unnamed, the NCSC study

preserves the anonymity of all participating persons and jurisdictions, but the authors
of the study believe that the seven cities studied are sufficiently diverse that conclusions
about the search warrant process based on observations in these cities are applicable to
most American metropolitan jurisdictions.
182. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs"
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and OtherStudies of "Lost " Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
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F. How Much Difference Will the Gates Case Make?
For valid reasons or for unsound ones, the Gates Court has dismantled
the two-pronged test. How much difference this development will make
in the operation of the warrant procedure remains to be seen. Gates does
undermine the "independent status" of the veracity and basis of knowledge
elements, 18 3 but does it totally destroy their independent status? Gates does
permit a deficiency in one element to be overcome by a strong showing
of the other, 184 but does it permit a gross deficiency (or an almost total
deficiency) in one element to be overcome by a strong showing of the other?
Something is left of the pre-Gates approach. The magistrate is not completely free to draw inferences at will. A "wholly conclusory" or "merely
conclusory" statement that furnishes the magistrate "virtually no basis
at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause" still will be
insufficient. 1 8 The magistrate's action "cannot be a mere ratification of
the bare conclusions of others." 18 6 "But when we move beyond the 'bare
bones' affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and Aguilar," the Court
tells us, "this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed set of rules,
like that which had developed from Spinelli. Instead, [a] flexible, commonsense standard... better serves the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment's
7
1
probable cause requirement."

8

Thus, as concurring Justice White read the majority opinion, and
he may well be right, the Court holds that "if an affidavit contains anything
more [than 'bare conclusions'] it should be left to the issuing magistrate
to decide, based solely on 'practical[ity]' and 'common sense,' whether
there is a fair probability that contraband will be found in a particular
place."""8 Consequently, continued Justice White, "the question whether
the probable cause standard is to be diluted is left to the common-sense

8
judgments of issuing magistrates."1

9

If the Gates majority did intend such a drastic result, it deserves strong
criticism. It is about as difficult to be against "flexibility," "practicality,"
and "common sense" as it is to be against the flag, motherhood, and
apple pie, but as dissenting Justice Brennan observed:
RESEARCHJ. 611, 666-67. I have read the draft report of the NCSC study of the search war-

rant process, and I concur in the conclusions Mr. Davies draws from this study. See also
Mertens & Wasserstrom, 7he Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe

Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 456 (1981) ("Courts rarely suppress evidence
by overruling a magistrate's finding of probable cause. There are, for example, no recent

decisions from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, or the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, holding a warrant insufficient.")
183. See 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28, 2332-33.

184.
185.
186.

Id. at 2329.
See id. at 2332.
Id.

187.

Id. at 2332-33.

188.

Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).

189.

Id.(White, J., concurring).
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Neither the [Aguilar-Spineli] standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a "practical, nontechnical" conception of prob-

able cause. Once a magistrate has determined that he has information before him that he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he has ample room
to use his common sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical
conception of probable cause.... It is no justification for rejecting [the Aguilar-Spinelli standards] that some courts may have
employed an overly technical version of [them].190
As pointed out earlier, 191 a detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing or a claim of first-hand observation should not compensate for the
lack of any assurance that the informant is truthful. As Judge Charles
Moylan has put it, "the direct allegation of firsthand knowledge or the
detail that implies firsthand knowledge have nothing to do with an inforor fabricate in
mant's veracity (a liar could allege firsthand knowledge
1 92
great detail as easily as could a truthful speaker).'
Conversely, as also noted earlier, 193 a strong showing, even an overwhelming showing, of general trustworthiness should not compensate for
the failure to explain how the informant acquired the information in this
particular case. To quote Judge Moylan again, "the qualities that
demonstrate a person's truthfulness have nothing to do with demonstrating
the basis of his knowledge on a particular occasion (demonstrably truthful
persons can be the bearers of hearsay, rumor, gossip, or 'bare conclusions' as surely as can be liars)."'194 If-as seemed to be universally agreed
(at least prior to Gates) and as Justice White emphasized in his concurring
opinion in Gates' 9 5-the

unsupported assertions or belief of even an of-

ficer known by the magistrate to be honest and experienced does not satisfy
can a similar assertion or belief by
the probable cause requirement, how
196
an honest informant pass muster?
It is possible to read Gates more cheerfully than does Justice White
(and myself, up to this point). It is possible to read the case as saying
190.
191.
192.
93, 108
193.
194.

Id. at 2357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 25 & 27.
Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Didand What It Did Not Do, 20CRIM. L. BULL.
(1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Didand What It Did Not Do, 20 CRIM. L. BULL.

93, 108 (1984).
195. See 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
196. The Gates majority never responds to this point, but in the first draft ofhis analysis
of the Gates case, Mr. Andrew P. Solomon of the HarvardLaw Review suggested a possible
answer: The reasons the presumptive reliability of police officers is not in itself sufficient
to offset any "basis of knowledge" deficiency in their affidavits may be the implicit assumption that such a deficiency in the case of the police (but not private citizens) evidences
the absence of any adequate basis of knowledge or deliberate concealment. This suggestion, however, was dropped from the final version of the Gates analysis, see The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 177 (1983), because no authority could be found
to support it.
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that a strong showing of the veracity element still may not overcome an
almost total failure to establish the basis of knowledge element (or even
agross deficiency on this element) and vice versa. That is, Gates conceivably
could stand for the proposition that only when a certain threshold of supporting facts is reached on each element-only when the affidavit sets forth
a decent amount of underlying circumstances of each element-will an
"overkill" or an unusually strong showing of one element compensate
for the deficiency on the other. Thus, at one point, after observing that
"a deficiency in one [element] may be compensated for, in determining
1 97
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other,'
the Gates majority continues as follows:
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual
reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities
in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly setforth
the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute
bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip. Likewise,
if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report
of criminal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to
criminal liability-we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of
his knowledge unnecessary. Conversely, even if we entertain some
doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that
the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight
than might otherwise be the case. 198
This passage suggests that while, say, "ten units" of underlying circumstances of each element were once necessary, not one or two units,
but rather five or seven still are required-and that only when the threshold
number of units of each element are presented to the magistrate can a deficiency in one be overcome by a strong showing of the other. But this one
passage in the Court's opinion cannot be read in isolation. And when
read in light of the entirety of the majority opinion, the view suggested
by this passage-that Gates still requires a substantial threshold of supporting facts on each element of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard-strikes me as
improbable.
The example of an unusually reliable informant who fails, in a particular case, to present thoroughly the basis of his knowledge, and the other
examples cited by the Court are, I am afraid, only supposed to be obvious
and graphic examples of what the Court considers the unduly rigid and
excessively technical nature of the standard that it is abandoning. To limit
the impact of Gates to what the Court deems the most poignant examples
of the need for a more "flexible," more "practical, common-sense" approach than that which had developed from Aguilar and Spinelli is, I believe,
to mistake the "advocacy" in the Gates opinion for its scope.
197.
198.

103 S. Ct. at 2329.
Id. at 2329-30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

HeinOnline -- 69 Iowa L. Rev. 580 1983-1984

PROBABLE CAUSE AND GOOD FAITH
I may be wrong (and I hope I am), but even a test that requires
the government to attain only a certain threshold of supporting facts on
both the veracity and basis of knowledge elements seems inconsistent with
the Court's manifest desire to free the magistrate
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.1 99
I find it hard to believe that the Court rejected the view that the
veracity and basis of knowledge elements "should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case" 20 0 only to preserve a "pint-sized version" of these elements as
separate and independent requirements to be exacted in every case-only
to require that another set of "specific 'tests' " (albeit somewhat less
demanding ones) "be satisfied by every informant's tip.' '201
Informants' tips, I think the Gates majority would say, come in too
"many shapes and sizes" and from too "many different types of persons ' 20 2
to require even a quasi-"two-pronged test." I think the Gates majority
would say that a semi-compartmentalized, semi-fluid two-pronged test contains as many (or even more) "built-in subtleties" 203 as a fullycompartmentalized test, and might encourage "an excessively technical
dissection of informants' tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated
issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to
the magistrate" 20 4 as much as (or even more than) a fully compartmen20 5
talized test.
A final question about Gates: Suppose the moment Sue and Lance
Gates had set out on "that interstate highway commonly used by travelers
to the Chicago area" the West Palm Beach police (in constant communication with the Bloomingdale police) had stopped the Gates couple's vehicle
and subjected it to a warrantless search under the Carroll doctrine. 20 6 In
other words, given the prior use of the two-pronged test in warrantless
as well as warrant cases, does Gates signal the abandonment of the test
in both contexts?
199.
200.

Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2327-28.

201. "The totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior
treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by
every informant's tip." Id. at 2328 (footnote omitted).
202. Id.

203.

Cf id. at 2331 (built-in subtleties of two-pronged test unlikely to assist magistrates

in making probable cause determinations).

204. Id. at 2330 (footnote omitted).
205. But see LaFave, supra note 136, at _; Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Did
and What It Did Not Do, 20 GRIM. L. BULL. 93, 115 (1984) (both suggesting a narrower
reading of Gates).

206.

See supra text accompanying notes 159-66.
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The answer is not clear. Some of the reasons the Court advanced
for abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test obviously apply only to warrant

cases: implementing "the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant" 20 7 and "encouraging recourse
to the warrant procedure '

20

8

by interpreting affidavits in a "common-

sense" rather than a "hypertechnical" manner 20 9 and by paying "great
deference" to a magistrate's probable cause determination. 210 Moreover,
the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or
search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive
police conduct, by assuring "the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer,
2' 11
his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.
Other reasons given for scrapping the two-pronged test in the search
warrant context, however, seem to apply a fortiori to at least some nowarrant settings as well. The Gates Court points out "that affidavits 'are
normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation' " and that " 'It]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity . . . have no proper place in this area.' ",212 But searches incident to
warrantless arrests (searches that often must be made quickly in order
to protect the arresting officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence),
searches and seizures made in "hot pursuit" of a suspect or designed to
obtain "evanescent" evidence, or otherwise carried out under exigent cir213
cumstances making compliance with the warrant requirement unfeasible
are always conducted "by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation."
Although the Gates Court asserts that search warrant applications are
"normally drafted by nonlawyers," in many jurisdictions this may not
be so. According to the NCSC draft report, for example, in five of the
seven cities studied, prosecuting attorneys directly participated in the warrant application process in the bulk of cases, sometimes virtually writing
the affidavits. 214 When "exigent circumstances" excuse the need to ob207.

103 S. Ct. at 2331.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).
Id. (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419).
Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); see also Israel,

Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REv. 221,
253 (1975) ("people often expect the police to have a warrant and are more likely to
cooperate when they see that the police do have the authorization of a magistrate").
212. 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
213. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 133-40, 152-71 (1980).

214. See R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The Search Warrant Process:
Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices 6-1 (National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Va., 1983) (draft report) (on file in the University of Iowa and University
of Michigan law libraries); see abo Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The
Michigan Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 221, 251 (1975) ("Although it is not legally required,
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tain a warrant, however, "nonlawyer" police officers obviously act on
their own.
More generally, if (as the Gates Court believes) "[t]he strictures that
inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement' ' 215 -if (as the Gates Court believes)
"anonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either
of the Spinelli prongs" 216-would not the wiser course be to abandon the
test in no-W/arrant as well as warrant settings? If, as the Court tells us,
"[w]e are convinced that this flexible, easily applied [totality of the circumstances] standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the [twopronged] approach," 217 why not achieve this better accommodation of
competing interests in all search and seizure contexts?
In part III of its opinion, the Gates Court embarked on an explanation of why it preferred a totality of the circumstances standard to "any
21 8
rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip."
The Court began by quoting the oft-quoted language of Brinegar v. United
States2 9-a case that involved a warrantless automobile search under the
Carroll doctrine:
Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a "practical, nontechnical conception." [Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176]. "In dealing with probable
cause... we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
0
[Id. at 175].22
The Court next turned to language in United States v. Cortez22 1-a case
that involved not simply warrantless activity but not even the assessment
of probable cause 222-to the effect that when appraising police conduct
the evidence collected "must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement.' '223 "As these comments illustrate," continued the Gates
Court-referring to comments made in two cases involving warrantless
applications for warrants [in Michigan] are often reviewed by a member of the prosecutor's
staff or a senior police official before being presented to a magistrate.").
215. 103 S.Ct. at 2331.
216. Id. at 2332.

217.

Id.

218.
219.

Id. at 2328.
338 U.S. 160 (1949).

220.

103 S. Ct. at 2328.

221. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
222. The Gates Court recognized that the "stop" in Cortez required only "particularized
suspicion," but deemed its observation in that case "also applicable to the probable cause

standard." 103 S.Ct. at 2328.
223.

Id. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).
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not readily, or

even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." ' 224 After noting that
"[i]nformants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many
different types of persons," 225 the Court proceeded to quote from a third
case involving warrantless police activity (and, again, one that involved
a "stop and frisk" and thus did not require probable cause):
As we said in Adams v. Williams, . . . "Informants' tips, like
all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene
may vary greatly in their value and reliability." Rigid legal rules
are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One simple rule will
226
not cover every situation."

Near the end of part I':l of its opinion, the Gates Court turned to,
and discussed extensively, Draper v. United States227 -a case involving a

warrantless arrest and a search incident to that arrest-calling it "the classic
case on the value of corroborative efforts of police officials.'

' 22

The tip

in Draper (a pre-Aguilar-Spinellicase), noted the Court, "might well not
have survived the rigid application of the 'two-pronged test' that developed
[subsequently].' '229
Does any of this sound like the Gates Court intended, or is willing,
to limit its abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test to the search warrant
setting? Gates did involve the validity of a search warrant and the opinion
does contain some language indicating that the decision is, or should be,
limited to such cases. Moreover, the Gates majority does quote the familiar
language in United States v. Ventresca23 to the effect that in determining

whether an affidavit establishes probable cause "the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases ... should be largely determined by the preference
to be accorded to warrants" (although this language is tucked away in
a footnote). 2 1 Thus, it is no great feat to make a plausible argument that
Gates is, or should be, limited to the search warrant context. But it will
be a great feat, I think, to convince the Court that handed down Gates
that its decision is, or should be, so limited.

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2328-29 (citations omitted). At this point the Court noted that "[t]he diversity
of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the totality of the circumstances approach
to probable cause, is reflected in our prior decisions on the subject." Id. n.7. The Court
then discussed three of its prior cases, but the one of the three discussed most extensively,
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), involved a warrandess search of an apartment
incident to a warrantless arrest.
227. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
228. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
229. Id. at 2334 n.12.
230.

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

231. See 103 S. Ct. at 2331 n.10 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 (1965)).
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II.

THE GATES CASE'S BEARING ON THE PROPOSED "REASONABLE,
GOOD FAITH BELIEF" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

In Gates, Justice White was the only member of the Court to address
the question whether there should be a "good faith" or "reasonable belief"
(or a "reasonable, good faith") exception to the exclusionary rule.
232
Reiterating the views he had advanced in his Stone v. Powell dissent,
Justice White "continue[d] to believe that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy where law enforcement officials act in the reasonable
belief that a search and seizure was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.' '233
Both in his Gates concurrence 234 and in his Stone dissent, 235 Justice
White found support for his views in the "good faith" test that governs
"constitutional tort" cases. When sued by the alleged victim of an illegal
search or seizure (in section 1983 actions against state officials and in Bivens
actions against federal police) the officer has a defense if he can establish
that he had a good faith belief that his conduct was lawful and that his
belief was "reasonable." 236 As Judge Jon Newman has observed, however,
232. 428 U.S. 465, 537-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
233. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2336 (White, J., concurring).
234. See id.at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
235. See 428 U.S. at 540-42 (White, J., dissenting).
236. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the plaintiffs, clergymen who had been
arrested for violating a "breach of the peace" statute (held unconstitutionalfouryears later)
when they attempted to use segregated facilities, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the arresting officers, seeking damages for deprivation of their civil rights.
A jury decided in their favor. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the state officers
would be liable for an "unconstitutional arrest~even if they acted in good faith and with
probable cause in making an arrest under a state statute not yet held invalid," Id.
at 550. The Fifth Circuit believed, as the Supreme Court described it, that "this stern
result was required by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)." Id. at 550-51. The
Supreme Court disagreed. It sustained the officers' contention that they should not be
liable "if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under
a statute . . .[they] reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." 1d. at 555. Pierson, therefore, did not involve an arrest
that was unlawful because the officer lacked probable cause or otherwise misjudged the
extent of his arrest power, but rather "an arrest unlawful only in the sense that it was
for a crime defined in a substantive statute later invalidated." LaFave, The FourthAmendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 307, 343 (1982). "Thus 'good faith' [or 'reasonable belief'] in the context of Pierson
meant only reliance on a duly enacted statute." Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals
to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ.447,
459 (1978). Indeed, it seems that Pierson did not involve a fourth amendment violation
at all. As pointed out in Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182 (discussing Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), also discussed in infra note 292), "an arrest that in
some sense violates another constitutional provision-because the underlying criminal
statute is invalid-does not, for that reason alone, also violate the fourth amendment."
Id. at 434. In such a case, and Pierson appears to have been such a case, the officer's
conduct is lawful because he "had probable cause at the time of the arrest, not because he
acted in good faith. Probable cause at the time of arrest does not dissipate because a substantive criminal statute is later construed differently or held unconstitutional." Id. at 425 (em-
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the "good-faith"-"reasonable belief" defense "was imported into section 1983 rather casually from the common law, has been extended uncritically, and operates in practice at best to create confusion and at worst to
2 7
defeat legitimate claims." :3

In Stone, Justice White argued for the admissibility of illegally seized
evidence in a criminal case "[w]hen law enforcement personnel have acted
mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds. ' 238 In Gates,
however, he dropped the subjective element of the "reasonable, good faith"
test:
I would measure the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure [under the proposed "reasonable, good faith" or
"reasonable belief' modification of the exclusionary rule] only
by objective standards. Even for warrantless searches, the requirement should be no more difficult to apply than the closely
related good faith test which governs civil suits under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.239
But the "good-faith"-"reasonable belief" test has turned out to be
phasis added). Although as indicated above, Piersonmight have been read very narrowly,
it has not been. Over the years, most lower courts have applied, or extended, the "good
faith" or "reasonable, good faith" tort defense to the more common situation in which
the officer lacked "probable cause," but "understandably" or "reasonably" misjudged
the sufficiency of the evidence. Seg LaFave, supra, at 343-44; cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (compensatory damage award appropriate only if school board
member acted with impermissible motivation or such disregard of student's constitutional
rights that action "cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith"). Moreover,
in Bivens actions-suits against federal agents predicated directly on the fourth
amendment-the prevailing view is that federal agents are entitled to the same "reasonable,
good faith" defense available to state police officials under § 1983. See, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand from the
Supreme Court); see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra, at 408; Newman, supra, at 459-62.
237. Newman, Suing the Lawbrakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy
for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 459 (1978); see supra note 236.
238. 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
239. 103 S.Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring). As Justice White noted, in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), because "substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials," id at 816, the Court defined "essentially
in objective terms," id. at 819, the "qualified" or "good faith" immunity federal officials enjoy in suits seeking damages against them. 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring). Such officials are now "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Although it received
much less attention than Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), decided the same
day, "Harlow is by far the more practically significant case, for it greatly reduces the exposure of most government officials to civil suit." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 62, 233 (1982). "Although Harlow turned on the qualified immunity of federal executive officials, the Court strongly implied [457 U.S. at 818 n.30] that state officials facing constitutional claims under § 1983 will benefit from the revised immunity standard."
Id. at 227 n.7. But the Court "did not explicitly mention local officials or § 1983 suits
based on statutory violations." Id.
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quite difficult to apply in the tort context. "One is confronted," reports
Professor LaFave, "with a mishmash of cases, so tangled by comparison
that one would be inclined to compliment Medusa's hairdresser." 240 Indeed, argues LaFave, the confusion produced by the "good faith""reasonable belief" test in the tort cases "is alone strong reason to question any proposal to intrude it into thousands upon thousands of criminal
241
case suppression hearings."
Nor is the elimination of the subjective element of the tort defense
likely to improve matters. What constitutes "good faith" in the tort context is not easy to say, but the concept is at least comprehensible. I am
not sure the same can be said for the other element of the tort defensewhat might be called "reasonable grounds to believe there were reasonable
grounds to believe" that a crime had occurred (or was occurring) or that
evidence of crime would be found in a particular case although there were
not really reasonable grounds to believe that this was so. This concept "involves nearly circular reasoning that promotes confusion" 242 and it contains an elusive distinction that is extremely difficult to grasp. 24 3 As Judge
Newman has pointed out:
To make out his case, [a person bringing an action for an arrest
in violation of his fourth amendment rights] must establish that
a reasonably prudent police officer, under all the circumstances
would not have had probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. Then . . . the officer still has a defense if he
acted in good faith and has a reasonable belief in the validity
of his action, that is, if he reasonably believed that he did have
probable cause. But if the plaintiff's own case requires him to
show an arrest that was not reasonably based on probable cause,
what does the defense mean? Surely the officer could not reasonably
believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful arrest, for
an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent
police officer could not reasonably believe there was probable
4
cause.

24

The notion that an officer may "reasonably" search on the basis of
apparent facts that would not have led "a reasonably discreet and pru5
dent" officer to search 24 -or that officers may "reasonably" arrest in
240.
241.
242.
for Law

LaFave, supra note 236, at 344.
Id.
Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy
Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460 (1978).

243.

See id. at 461.

244.

Id. at 460; see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 454: "[Blecause

reasonableness is already built into the concept of probable cause,

. .

.to recognize the

possibility of a 'reasonable mistake' as to probable cause would be to acknowledge the
possibility of an officer acting out of a 'reasonable unreasonable belief.' " Id.

245.

See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931).

To show probable cause it is not necessary that the arresting officer should have
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circumstances when "prudent men in the shoes of these officers" would
not have seen enough to make an arrest 246-is even harder to grasp in
light of Gates.
The Gates Court stressed that "probable cause" is a "practical,
common-sense" concept, 247 a "flexible, easily applied standard, ' 248 and
a "fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set

of legal rules. '249 The Court made it fairly clear, I think, that "probable
cause" is something less than "more-probable-than-not" (although how much
less is anything but clear). 25) Indeed, at one point the Court told us that
"probable cause requires only a probability or substantialchance of criminal
activity.' '2.1
How could the officer have reasonably misapplied a "flexible, easily
applied standard"? How could the officer have reasonably made the wrong
"practical, common-sense judgment"? How could the officer have had
a "reasonable, good faith" belief that probable cause existed if it turns
out that the totality of circumstances did not add up to even a "substantial chance of criminal activity"?
before him legal evidence of the suspected illegal act ....
It is enough if the
apparent facts which have come to his attention are sufficient, in the circumstances, to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that liquor
is illegally possessed in the automobile to be searched.

Id.
246. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959):
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant
a prudent man in believing that the offense had been committed.... We turn
then to the question whether prudent men in the shoes of these officers [referring to Brinegar v. United Stats, 338 U.S. at 175] would have seen enough to
permit them to believe that ?etitioner was violating or had violated the law.

Id.
247. 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2328.
250. At one point in its discussion of probable cause the Court observed that "[f]inelytuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision." Id. at 2330.
It then quoted Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, to the effect that "only the probability, and not
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." 103 S.
Ct. at 2330. Immediately thereafter, the Court referred to § SS 210.1(7) of the Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. The commentary to this section points out that the term
"reasonable cause" was used rather than the constitutional language ("probable cause")
"in order to avoid the possible implication that 'probable cause' requires a standard of
'more-probable-than-not,' which the Reporters rejected." &e MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 210.1(7) commentary at 499 (1975). In maintaining that
the Illinois Supreme Court erred in thinking that "the corroboration of innocent activity"
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n. 13, the Court
recalled that "all of the corroborating detail established in Draper ... was of entirely innocent activity." Id. (emphasis added). "This," it continued, "is perfectly reasonable. As
discussed previously, probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Id. (emphasis added).
251. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13 (emphasis added).
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To impose a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" exception on Gates'
soft standard for upholding search warrants strikes me as even less
defensible-and even more incomprehensible. After Gates it does not require very much to issue a warrant, but it takes even less to uphold one
on review. All that is needed is a "substantial basis" for a "fair probability"-or "substantial chance"--"that contraband or evidence of a crime
'252
will be found in a particular place."
"[T]he case dearest to the hearts of those advocating the 'good faith'
[or the 'reasonable belief] exception [is one] where evidence is found in
execution of an arrest or search warrant later determined to have been
improperly issued by the magistrate. "253 But the Gates case so dilutes the
standard for issuing, and for upholding, warrants that it essentially adopts
the "good faith" or "reasonable belief" theme in the warrant context.
Indeed, if one puts together and takes seriously the language used in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Gates-whether the magistrate had
a "substantial basis" for a "substantial chance" that criminal activity
existed or that evidence of crime would be found-the Gates standard for
upholding a warrant on review seems even lower than a "reasonable, goodfaith" test.
To impose a "reasonable belief" exception on top of this already
diluted standard surely would amount to a double dilution. 254 To say that
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be admissible even though
the police acked a "substantial basis" for a "substantial chance" of criminal
activity as long as they had a reasonable belief that they had a "substantial
basis" for a "substantial chance" would be to promulgate an almost mindboggling standard. However semanticists might explain it or wherever
mathematicians might place it on a scale of one to a hundred, it surely
would approach "the 'subjective' good faith approach condemned by the
Supreme Court nearly twenty years ago in Beck v. Ohio. "255
252. See id. at 2332, 2335 n.13.
253. LaFave, supra note 236, at 352; see also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2344 (White, J.,
concurring). "The argument for a good-faith exception is strongest . . .when law en-

forcement officers have reasonably relied on a judicially-issued search warrant." Id.
254.

Although Justice White regards an officer's reliance on ajudicially-issued search

warrant as an especially strong case for applying a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, see 103 S. Ct. at 2344 (White, J., concurring), even he would not apply
such an exception when the material presented to the magistrate is "so clearly lacking

in probable cause that no well-trained officer could reasonably have thought that a warrant should issue." Id. at 2346 (White, J., concurring). But if the material presented to

the magistrate failed to provide so much as a "substantial basis" for a "substantial chance"
that criminal activity existed or that contraband would be found, would the material
presented not be so lacking in probable cause "that no well-trained officer could reasonably
have thought that a warrant should issue"? Why is it necessary or desirable to give the
police any more room for mistakes than the ample leeway Gates already gives them when
they act pursuant to a warrant?
255. See Stewart, supra note 173, at 1401:
[I]f the ["reasonable, good faith" belief] proposal is to tolerate searches and
seizures where, despite the deference given to the magistrate's determination
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THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT"
CASES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS

Although I fail to see how an officer who applies for a warrant may
be said to have reasonably believed that he had probable cause when the
issuing magistrate's probable cause determination fails to satisfy even the
very low standard for review set forth in Gates, the situation may be different when several officers are involved in the chain of events. Suppose
Officer A applies for a search warrant although he lacks even a "substantial basis" for a "fair probability" that contraband will be found in the
place described. Suppose nevertheless that the magistrate improperly issues
the warrant. Suppose further that Officer B, who played no role in the
application for the warrant and who has no idea that Officer A's affidavit
was inadequate, searches the designated place and finds contraband.
Whatever may be said for Officer A, did not Officer B act "reasonably"?
From his limitedperspective he certainly did. Thus, we are not inclined
to criticize Officer B, let alone make him respond in damages. But the
exclusionary rule does not, and is not designed to, "punish" the individual
officer. Rather it is "aimed at affecting the wider audience of all law en'256
forcement officials and society at large.

Up to this point, I have treated the "constitutional tort" cases and
the exclusionary rule cases interchangeably, for I find difficult and confusing in any context the notion that an officer who lacks "reasonable
grounds" to make a search or seizure still may reasonably believe that
he did have reasonable grounds. But there are not a few situations
(especially when several officers are involved at various points along the
way), and I did not mean to suggest otherwise, when an individual officer's "understandable" or "reasonable" conduct should protect him from
personal liability but still not permit the use of illegally seized evidence
in a criminal prosecution.
Whiteley v. Warden25 7 comes readily to mind. There the arresting officers acted on the basis of a radio bulletin that a warrant was out for
the defendants' arrest. They neither knew nor had any reason to know
that the affidavit underlying the arrest was inadequate. "Certainly police

[citing Gates], a reviewing court cannot conclude that the police officer had probable cause-even while giving the officer the benefit of the doubt where he
reasonably relied on a mistaken view of the law or the facts-it approaches the
"subjective" good faith approach condemned by the Supreme Court nearly twenty

years ago in Beck v. Ohio [379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)].
Id
256. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the exclusionary
rule, focused upon general, not specific, deterrence, depends not upon threatening a sanction
for lack of compliance but upon removing an inducement to violate Fourth Amendment
rights"); infra note 266.
257. 401 U.S. 560 (1971), discussed in Mertens & Wasserstrom, supranote 182, at 442-43.

HeinOnline -- 69 Iowa L. Rev. 590 1983-1984

PROBABLE CAUSE AND GOOD FAITH

officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants,"
observed the Court, "are entitled to assume that the officers requesting
to support an independaid offered the magistrate the information requisite
258
ent judicial assessment of probable cause."

There is no doubt, therefore, that if a civil action had been brought
against them the arresting officers would have been, and should have been,
protected from personal liability. But the issue presented in Whiteley was
the admissibility in a criminal prosecution of evidence seized during a
search incident to a challenged arrest. In this setting the Court had little
trouble concluding that "an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated
from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow
officers to make the arrest.' '259
Coolidge v. New Hampshire260 is another criminal prosecution that comes

to mind. The search warrants in that case were issued by the state attorney general himself, acting as a justice of the peace, even though he
was actively in charge of the investigation. 261 Arguably the police who
carried out the search were entitled to assume that the state's chief government enforcement officer knew what he was doing. In any event, they
were entitled to rely on the fact that the attorney general "was unquestionably authorized as a justice of the peace to issue warrants under thenexisting state law.' '262 But, because the Attorney General "was not the
neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution, "263 the Court
had little trouble concluding in the context in which the issue arose that
"the search stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all.

264

(And it was unable to justify the search on any other theory.)

258.

401 U.S. at 568.

259.

Id.; see also People v. Ramirez,

__

Cal. 3d __

, 668 P.2d 761, 194 Cal. Rptr.

454 (1983), and cases discussed therein. In Ramirez the arresting officer acted on the basis
of what the police computer system indicated was an outstanding bench warrant, but the
warrant had in fact been recalled six months earlier and no "independent probable cause"
existed to support the arrest. In rejecting the state's argument that the arrest should be
upheld because the arresting officer relied in good faith on information communicated
to him through "official channels," the court, per Justice Mosk, observed:
Because the recall of the warrant was, or should have been, within the "collective knowledge" of the police, we cannot permit the arresting officer to rely
with impunity on his fellow officers' errors of omission, but must impute their
accurate knowledge to him.
...In this case ... we focus not on the actions of the arresting officer but
on the conduct of law enforcement generally. Suppressing the fruits of an arrest
made on a recalled warrant will deter further misuse of the computerized criminal
information systems and foster more diligent maintenance of accurate and current records.
Id. at

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

__

, 668 P.2d at 765, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 458.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).
See id. at 447, 450.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 453.
Id.
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The infamous Irvine case2 65 illustrates how an individual police officer who participates in a challenged search can act quite "reasonably"
(from his limited perspective) even though "the law enforcement profession as a whole ' 266 acts quite outrageously. In Irvine the police made
repeated illegal entries into petitioner's home, first to install a secret
microphone and then to move it to the bedroom and the bedroom closet,
in order to listen to the conversations of the occupants for over a month.
Although the Court affirmed a conviction based on the fruits of this misconduct because it had not yet decided to impose an exclusionary rule on
the states as a matter of federal constitutional law, Justice Jackson, who
the police did "would
wrote the principal opinion, exclaimed that what
267
be almost incredible if it were not admitted.
The record in the Irvine case was sent to the United States Department of Justice for possible federal prosecution of the police officers who
had secreted the microphones in the Irvine home. An FBI investigation
disclosed, however, that these officers " 'were acting under orders of the
Chief of Police, who in turn was acting with the full knowledge of the
local District Attorney.' "268 Moreover, "the law enforcement technique
disapproved in [Irvine] appears to have been no more than common police
procedure in the county where the conduct took place.' '269
The facts turned up by the FBI investigation may have been a good
reason to protect the particular officers who had installed the microphones
in the Irvine home from criminal or civil liability. But they would have
constituted a very poor reason for withholding the exclusionary sanction,
if such a sanction had been in effect. As Professor LaFave has said, to
apply the exclusionary rule when the officer who conducted the search
or seizure is individually blameworthy "but not when the violation of the
fourth amendment is caused by systemic defects, directly attributable to
'the institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has

265. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
266. "The justification for the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper methods
is to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole-not the aberrant individual
officer-to adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion of
the citizen's constitutional rights." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
267. 347 U.S. at 132.
268. Comment, State Police, UnconstitutionallyObtained Evidence and Section 242 of the Civil
Rights Statute, 7 STAN. L. REv. 76, 94 n.75 (1954) (quoting Letter of February 15, 1955,
from Warren Olney III, Assistant United States Attorney General). In addition, a provi-

sion of the California Penal Code prohibiting the installation or use of a dictograph in
any house without the consent of the owner or occupant specifically exempted the use

and installation of such devices by a police officer " 'expressly authorized thereto by the
head of his office or department or by a district attorney, when such use and installation
are necessary in the performance of their duties in detecting crime.' " Id. Query whether
use of the hidden microphone for over a month was "necessary." In any event, query whether
prosecution of the chief of police or the district attorney might have been possible.

269.

Id. at 93.
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transgressed,' would be to turn the fourth amendment on its head. '27 0
Thus, Justice White seems to have been wide of the mark in Stone
when, urging a substantial modification of the exclusionary rule "so as
to prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence
at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his
conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for
this belief," 271 he found a strong analogy in the law governing the "constitutional tort" cases: "If the defendant in criminal cases may not recover
for a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy [when he brings a
civil action against the police], it makes even less sense to exclude the
'
evidence solely on his behalf.

272

In the first place, the exclusion of evidence in a criminal case is "not
a benefit conferred upon the defendant 'solely on his behalf to compensate him for the prior wrong done to him, as might be said of tort
damages. '"273 Rather, "[t]he defendant is, at best, an incidental beneficiary
when exclusion occurs for the purpose, as the Supreme Court stated in
Stone v. Powell, . . . of 'removing the incentive' to disregard the fourth

amendment so that 'the frequency of future violations will decrease.' "274
In the second place, the reason that the alleged victim of an illegal
search or seizure may not recover damages for a "good-faith invasion
of his privacy" when he brings an action against a particular officer-the
concern that the officer who violated the plaintiffs rights may have done
so because the department inadequately trained him or because his colleagues failed to pass on relevant information to him-has no application
when the question presented is whether the exclusionary rule should be
invoked. The exclusion of evidence in a criminal case is "not a sanction
to which the officer is personally subjected, but rather is one imposed upon
the system.''

275

"Fortunately," as I have noted elsewhere, "whatever may be said
for burglars and many other criminals, police officers are not independent entrepreneurs. Rather, they are members of a law enforcement agen-

270. LaFave, supra note 236, at 347-48 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 651 (1980), discussed in infra text accompanying notes 280-85).
271. 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).

272.

Id. at 541-42 (White, J., dissenting).

273. LaFave, supra note 236, at 346.
274. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) (citation omitted)); cf
Stewart, supra note 173, at 1396:

[The exclusionary rule] has been criticized for benefiting defendants in a manner often disproportionate to the degree to which their fourth amendment rights
were violated ....

However, this disproportionality is significant only if one

conceives the purpose of the rule as compensation for the victim. Because I view
the exclusionary rule as necessary to preserve fourth amendment guarantees,
I do not find this criticism persuasive.

Id.
275.

LaFave, supra note 236, at 346.
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cy, a structural governmental entity."276 The exclusionary rule, therefore,
does not and need not seek to control police behavior the way the criminal
law seeks to control the behavior of the general public, but "through a
police department's institutional compliance with judicially articulated
fourth amendment standards" -that is, by "systemic deterrence. 277 Thus,
the failure to apply the exclusionary rule in a case in which the offending
officer was misinformed or insufficiently trained "would communicate an
unmistakable message to 'the wider audience of law enforcement officials
and society at large' [that] there is really no need to expend either the
money or the effort" to ensure that police officers are sufficiently trained
27
and appropriately informed.
If, for the reasons just discussed, the analogy between the law governing civil actions against individual officers and the proposed modification
of the exclusionary rule is a poor one, a better tort analogue is not hard
to find-a civil action against the employing municipality itself. Four years
after Justice White found support for a "reasonable, good faith" softening of the exclusionary rule in the section 1983 cases, 279 the Court held,
in Owen v. City of IndependAnce, 280 that when there is a basis for suing a
governmental entity under section 1983,281 the governmental unit "may not
assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability.' '282
Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court (joined by Justice
White), maintained that the Court's result was "compelled both by the
legislative purpose in enacting [section 1983] and by considerations of public
283
policy":
[Section] 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation
to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against
276.

Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather

than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 659-60 (1983).

277. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 394; see also id. at 399-401; Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974); Kamisar, Does
(Did)(Should) the Exclusionay Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 GREIGHTON L. RIV. 565, 597 n.204, 659-62 (1983); LaFave, supra note

236, at 319-20, 350-51; Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and
Damage Remedies, 73 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 881-83 (1982); Stewart, supra note

173, at 1400.
278. LaFave, supra note 236, at 347.
279.

See supra text accompanying notes 271-72.

280. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
281. Under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a local
governmental body may be held liable only when the unconstitutional act implements
or executes "a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy." As Justice Stewart has
pointed out, "[slince most fourth amendment violations are the result of wrongful actions
by individual law enforcement officials, not of unlawful governmental policies, the circumstances under which a governmental body will be held liable for a fourth amendment
violation are likely to be rare, indeed." Stewart, supra note 173, at 1388.
282. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638.
283. Id. at 650.
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future constitutional deprivations, as well. . . .The knowledge
that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct,
whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness
of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens'
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat that damages might
be levied against the city may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed
to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Such procedures are particularly beneficial in
preventing those "systemic" injuries that result not so much from
the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive
behavior of several governmental officials, each of whom may
28 4
be acting in good faith.
The Court also had this to say about affording a municipality the
same qualified immunity from liability that previous decisions had conferred on various government officials:
At the heart of [the] justification for a qualified immunity for
the individual official is the concern that the threat of personal
monetary liability will introduce an unwarranted and unconscionable consideration into the decisionmaking process, thus
paralyzing the governing official's decisiveness and distorting his
judgment on matters of public policy.... The inhibiting effect
is significantly reduced, if not eliminated, however, when the
threat of personal liability is removed. First, as an empirical matter, it is questionable whether the hazard of municipal loss will
deter a public officer from the conscientious exercise of his duties.
...More important, though, is the realization that consideration of the municipality's liability for constitutional violations is
quite properly the concern of its elected or appointed officials.
Indeed, a decisionmaker would be derelict in his duties if, at
some point, he did not consider whether his decision comports
with constitutional mandates and did not weigh the risk that a
violation might result in an award of damages from the public
treasury .... "To criticize section 1983 liability because it leads
decisionmakers to avoid the infringement of constitutional rights
' 285
is to criticize one of the statute's raisons d'etre."
Because proponents of a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" modification of the exclusionary rule have analogized to the law governing section
1983 actions against individual officers, and the argument has a certain
appeal, I have dwelt at some length on why the analogy is a poor one.

284. Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1224 (1977)) (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
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At this point in the Article, however', I do not think I need belabor the
point that the law governing tort actions against a governmental entity
itself provides a -better analogy for exclusionary rule purposes.
As long as he acts in "good faith" or "understandably" or "reasonably," the officer who commits a fourth amendment violation "may go
about his business secure in the knowledge that a qualified immunity will
protect him," 28 6 but in these instances sanctions should still be imposed
upon "the system." Governmental entities should still be liable for "those
'systemic' injuries that result" 2 87 and the exclusionary rule should still
be invoked in order to give rise to the "systemic deterrence' '288 the rule
is supposed to achieve.
IV. THE TRUE "REASONABLE" FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS: A LOOK AT THE
RETROACTIVITY/PROSPECTIVITY CASES
Opponents of the good faith-reasonable belief proposal point out that
"inmany instances, reasonable mistakes by law enforcement officials are
already tolerated by the fourth amendment.' '289 Indeed they are. 290 But
sometimes it is no answer to say that the fourth amendment allows room
for "some mistakes on [the officers'] part" so long as they are the mistakes
of "reasonable men.' '291 It is not a satisfactory answer when the officer
relies on a presumptively valid statute that purports to authorize the very
search or seizure in question, 292 and the statute is subsequently struck
286.

Id. at 657.

287. See supra text accompanying note 284.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
289. Stewart, supra note 17"1, at 1401 (emphasis original).
290. For example, reasonable factual mistakes are generally tolerated with respect to
whether probable cause existed, or whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
search, or whether a third party had authority to permit a search of a certain place. See
LaFave, supra note 236, at 348-49; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 428-29;
Stewart, supra note 173, at 1401.
291. [All the probable cause definitions or standards] seek to give fair leeway
for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations
which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see also supra notes 245-46.
292. I put aside those instances when the police make an arrest for violation of a substantive statute or ordinance (e.g., an abortion statute, or an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets without a permit) and a search of the arrestee turns up drugs, but the
regulation is subsequently found unconstitutional. In such situations the arrest and the
search incident to it are valid not because the officer acted in "good faith" but because
no fourth amendment violations occurred at all. As Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31 (1979), makes plain, such police action "falls within the traditional definition of probable cause." LaFave, supra note 236, at 349. The officer did not lack probable cause to
believe that the person he arrested was violating the substantive law for which he arrested
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down. Nor is it a good answer when the officer relies on "a longstanding
and widespread practice to which [the] Court has not spoken, but which
a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved,' '293
and the practice is subsequently overturned.
In such instances (putting aside retroactivity problems and focusing
only on the case chosen as the vehicle for invalidating the statute or
establishing a new rule), the fourth amendment, until now at any rate,
allows no room for mistakes. The evidence is suppressed even though the
best-trained and most prudent officer "in the shoes of these officers" would
have acted the same way. 294 Indeed, the evidence is suppressed, it might

be said, even though "the law enforcement profession as a whole" 295 has
acted reasonably.
Payton v. New York 296 provides a good example. There the Court found
violative of the fourth amendment a New York statute that authorized
police officers to make warrantless entries of private residences in order
to effect "routine felony arrests"-that is, "arrests in which there was
ample time to obtain a warrant.' '297 When the Court decided Payton, a
clear majority of the states that had taken a position on the question still
permitted warrantless entries into the home to arrest even in the absence
of exigent circumstances, 298 but the trend was in the opposite direction:

ten of the twelve state courts that had confronted the constitutional issue
had held such warrantless arrests to be invalid; five of the seven United
States Courts of Appeals that had considered the issue had expressed a
similar opinion. 299 But none of these fifteen state and federal cases had

him simply because the law turned out to be invalid."[Rleliance on a substantive criminal

statute later held unconstitutional does not dissipate a finding of probable cause." Stewart,
supra note 173, at 1401; see DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37-38. "[T]hat an arrest that in some

sense violates another constitutional provision-because the underlying criminal statute is
invalid-does not, for that reason alone, also violate the fourth amendment. DeFillippo

holds that the probable cause standard does not incorporateother constitutional protections."
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 434 (emphasis added); see also supra note 236.

The victim of an arrest under an unconstitutional substantive statute "has the opportunity and incentive to vindicate his rights at the trial for that offense." Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra, at 426. But an unconstitutional proceduralstatute-i.e., a statute which

by its own terms authorizes arrests or searches that violate the fourth amendment-carries
no penalty of its own. Thus, "a victim of police action undertaken pursuant to such a
statute... has neither the incentive nor the opportunity to challenge its constitutionality
except through a motion to suppress the evidence obtained." Id. at 427.
293. See infra note 325 (discussion of United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982),
concerning what constitutes a "clear break" or "sharp break" in the law for purposes
of nonretroactive application).
294. Cf Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959), quoted in supra note 246.
295. See supra note 266; see also supra note 259.
296. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
297. Id. at 574, 583.
298. See id. at 598-99.
299. See id. at 574-75, 599-600.
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been decided before January 14, 1970, when the arrest in Payton took
place.300

Thus, the State of New York forcefully argued that regardless of
whether the officers should have obtained an arrest warrant before entering Payton's apartment, their failure to do so should not entitle the defendant to the exclusion of the evidence. For the officers had had ample probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a murder, had entered
his apartment during the daytime, and had done so "under the express
authority of an 1881 state statute, at a time when neither they nor any
other law enforcement official could have had any serious doubts about
30 1
the legality of following the statute":

[W]hen the officers entered Payton's apartment to arrest him
in January 1970, they were acting in accord with a statute that
had been part of New York's living law for almost one hundred
years. Neither the officers nor their supervisors had any reason
to doubt the legality of the entry. .

.

. [The evidence] will be

barred not because the constable blundered but rather because
he followed the law. Lessons like this one breed confusion,
cynicism and scorn for law. Obviously, these are not the attitudes
that the exclusionary rule should foster ...
We are not urging the Court to allow evidence to be admitted
whenever officers in "good faith" follow their own precepts, or
even the precepts of a lower judicial officer, about what constitutes legal behavior. We are urging a much narrower rule that
would admit evidence only when, as in Payton's case:
(1) the police follow an unambiguous pronouncement;
(2) that pronouncement is a statute;
(3) the statute clearly was not designed to evade Fourth
Amendment requirements; and
(4) at the time the officers act neither they, their supervisors
in the police department, nor the district attorneys with whom they

work could have any reasonable doubt about the constitu30 2
tionality of the officers' conduct under the statute.
300.

See Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-11

n.48.
301. Brief for Appellee at 81, Payton.
302. Id. at 86, 88-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Supplemental
Brief for Appellee at 11-12.
[I1f prior to entering Payton's apartment, the police officers had consulted legal
advisors-within or outside the Police Department-the officers would have been

told that as long as they had probable cause to believe that Payton had committed a murder and that he was in his apartment, they could lawfully enter without
an arrest warrant, as they did, to effect the arrest.

Id.
I think the lawyers for the State of New York made as fine an argument as could be
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In reversing Payton's conviction because the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless entry into a suspect's home
in order to effect a routine felony arrest, how did the Court respond to
the state's argument that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when
the challenged police conduct was expressly authorized by statute (at least
when, as in Payton, the police relied on a longstanding statute that codified
a widespread practice and one that they had no reason to believe was unconstitutional at the time they acted)? The Court did not pause to consider the argument (did not deem it worthy of discussion?). On remand
from the Supreme Court, however, the New York Court of Appeals did
explicitly discuss this argument-and emphatically rejected it.
Speaking for a unanimous court on this issue, Judge Sol Wachtler did
not deny that the police who entered Payton's apartment without a warrant could hardly be blamed for relying on a nineteenth-century statute
made for staying the exclusionary rule in Payton-type circumstances, regardless of whether
the officers should have obtained an arrest warrant, but their adversaries were equally
able. Payton's lawyers pointed out that appellee's test would
require the Court to overrule Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967) [quoted
in infra note 305] and to depart from long adhered-to principles of constitutional
adjudication which afford the prevailing litigant the relief which turns upon the
result achieved. Because these principles are sound and the test proposed by
appellee unfounded and untenable, appellee's argument is without merit.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 7. Continued the appellants:
The spectre of a purely prospective ruling, particularly in criminal cases, would
effectively preclude important constitutional issues from ever being raised. A
non-indigent defendant would not retain an attorney and incur the costs of an
appeal if the attorney advised that despite a clear violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, there was no possibility that his conviction could be reversed. A
public defender or assigned attorney would, in a world of limited resources, more
properly turn his attention to those individuals who could be aided in some concrete fashion ...
[Unlike cases raising retroactivity problems] [w]hen the validity of a statute
is before the Court for the first time and it is determined that the statute is violative
of the Fourth Amendment, any inquiry into the good faith of the arresting officers or their superiors is beside the point. For when a legislature passes such
a statute, it is obvious that the litigant who is first to challenge its validity has
no quarrel with the police but with the legislature which authorized them to violate
the Constitution. In such a setting the public interest served by the exclusionary
rule is that of deterring legislators from enacting statutes which violate the Fourth
Amendment. . . . [Wihere, as in the case of the invalid search warrant, the
authorization itself violates the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule plays
an important role in deterring such authorizations from being made.
Id. at 8-11 (footnote omitted).
Moreover, maintained Payton's lawyers, "besides being unfounded in sound constitutional doctrine, the four-pronged rule appellee proposes is simply unworkable." Id. at
12. And the final branch of the proposed rule-whether any one in the law enforcement
hierarchy could have "any reasonable doubt" about the statute's constitutionality-is "least
manageable of all." Id. "[The holdings of a single court, or even a persuasive law review
article, might cause doubts about the validity of legislation. But the inquiry about when
such a doubt arose or should have arisen, is a morass into which the courts should not
be required to venture." Id. at 13.
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that reflected a widespread practice, but pointed out that
the exclusionary rule serves to insure that the State itself, and
not just its police officers, respect the constitutional rights of the
accused. Thus, for instance, evidence will be suppressed if it was
seized by the police pursuant to a [warrant] [or] to an order expressly authorized by a statute later determined to be unconstitutional [citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)]. In those
cases, of course, the police simply carried out a court order, as
they were bound to do, and the fault lay with other branches
of the government. Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule was held
applicable to deny the State the benefits of its violation of the
303
defendant's constitutional rights.
The New York Court of Appeals recognized that "when retroactivity is at issue, concerns similar to those expressed by the prosecutor may
303. People v. Payton, 51 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 412 N.E.2d 1288, 1290-91, 433 N.Y.S.2d
61, 63-64 (1980); see also LaFave, supra note 236, at 350-51 (state is responsible for actions
of its legislature as well as its police and failure to apply the exclusionary rule when legislature
violates fourth amendment "would create an incentive for future systemic inroads upon
the fourth amendment"); Reply Brief for Appellants, Payton, quoted in supra note 302 (when
legislature itself authorizes police t.o violate the fourth amendment "the exclusionary rule
plays an important role in deterring such authorizations from being made").
In the case referred to by the New York Court of Appeals, Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court struck down New York's electronic surveillance statute
and excluded evidence obtained pursuant to a judicially issued "eavesdrop order" as provided by the New York statute. Other cases that address this issue include Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), discussed in infra note 304; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), discussed in supra text accompanying notes 260-64; and Sibron
v, New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Ybarra the police possessed a valid warrant authorizing the search of a small public tavern and the person of the bartender for drugs. But
the police detained and "frisked" a number of persons (including defendant) who happened to be in the tavern when the search warrant was executed. The frisk of defendant
produced narcotics. In holding the narcotics inadmissible, the Court, perJustice Stewart,
seemed to ignore an Illinois statute that authorized the police to detain and search any
person on premises being searched pursuant to a warrant. At the very end of the opinion,
however, the Court noted that the state law "falls within the category of statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to
hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional searches." 444 U.S. at 96 n.11. The Court
then referred to Berger and most of the other cases cited above.
In his Gates concurrence, Justice White recognized, referring to the Berger-Sibron-AlmeidaSanchez line of cases, that "we have held that the exclusionary rule required suppression
of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not previously declared
unconstitutional, which purported to authorize the searches in question without probable
cause and without a valid warrant." 103 S. Ct. at 2341 n.12 (White, J., concurring).
But "the result in these cases may well be different," he added, "under a 'good-faith'
exception." Id. (White, J., concurring). At another point in his concurrence, however,
Justice White noted that, because a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule might
not provide a sufficient supply of state criminal cases in which to resolve unsettled questions of fourth amendment law, he "'would entertain the possibility of according the benefits
of a new Fourth Amendment rule to the party in whose case the rule is first announced."
Id. at 2347 n.19 (White, J., concurring).
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be considered important, or in some cases, controlling factors, ' 30 4 but
"they cannot affect the outcome of the 'first case' to decide the substantive point. ' 30 5 If the law were otherwise, observed Judge Wachtler,
the Supreme Court's decision in this case, and other decisions
in like cases, could not affect Payton's conviction or the prosecution in which the statute or practice was first challenged. They
would only provide guidance for future cases. In a system of
government which requires the courts generally to decide only
concrete cases and controversies, and to avoid advisory or purely
prospective opinions [referring to the language in Stovall v. Denno
quoted in supra note 305] this would mean that statutes and
widespread practices broadly affecting the rights of accused persons would, ironically, be beyond judicial review for all practical purposes. Thus it is not so much the nature of the exclusionary rule but rather the nature of judicial process and the
need to actually resolve a live controversy which requires that
the exclusionary sanction be applied in cases which change the
law or hold invalid practices which had previously been widely
30 6
believed to be constitutionally acceptable.
The Supreme Court has certainly proceeded on this basis in the
constitutional-criminal procedure area. Over the years the Court has
employed an "extraordinary diversity of rules" 30 7 for locating the "cut304.

51 N.Y.2d at 176, 412 N.E.2d at 1291, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 64. At this point, the

court cited United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), which declined to apply AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), retroactively to searches conducted prior
to the date of the decision in that case. In Almeida-Sanchez, although Border Patrol agents
had relied on a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act and an accompanying
regulation that purported to authorize such searches, the Court held a warrantless
automobile search without probable cause some twenty-five air miles from the Mexican
border to be violative of the fourth amendment. But the agents in Peltier, emphasized
the Court, conducted the car search "in reliance upon a validly enacted statute, supported
by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous [lower federal courts'] approval."
422 U.S. at 541.
305. 51 N.Y.2d at 176, 412 N.E.2d at 1291, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 64. At this point, the
court cited Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which the Supreme Court declined
to apply United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967), retroactively to lineups or other pretrial confrontations conducted in
the absence of counsel prior to the date of the decisions. The Court, perJustice Brennan,
recognized that Wade and Gilbert, therefore, were "the only victims of pretrial confrontations in the absence of their counsel to have the benefit of the rules established in their
cases." 388 U.S. at 301. But the Court deemed that benefit "an unavoidable consequence
of the necessity that constitutioral adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies
of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve
issues solely in concrete cases on controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying Wade and Gilbert the benefit of today's decisions." Id.; see also United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 n.12 (1975).
306. 51 N.Y.2d at 175, 412 N.E.2d at 1291, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
307. F. Allen, TheJudicialQuestforPenalJustice:The Warren Court and the CriminalCases,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 530 n.53.
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off point" for application of a law-changing decision. But it has never
handed down what might be termed a "purely prospective" or a
"prospective-prospective" criminal procedure decision 3 08 -that is, one that
announces a new rule governing only future events and transactions.
Although Mapp v. Ohio3 9 was applied only to cases still pending on direct
review510 and Katz v. United States311 and Chimel v. California31 2 were applied only to searches or seizures conducted after the date on which these
decisions were handed down 3 13 "the fact remains that Ms. Mapp and
Messrs. Katz and Chimel did obtain relief in the cases which bear their
314
names."
But Dean Francis Beytagh, the author of a leading article on the prospectivity/retroactivity controversy, has challenged Justice Brennan's admonition in Stovall that article III of the Constitution bars purely prospective decision making in constitutional cases. "Cases in which a new rule
is adopted but applied in a wholly prospective fashion," he maintains,
"are nonetheless decided on the merits.' '315 Although the result in a purely
prospective decision would turn on the old rule, not the new one, that
fact, insists Beytagh, "does not remove the case from the category of an
article III case or controversy.' '316 And Justice Walter Schaefer, the author
of the most recent article on the prospectivity/retroactivity problem, has
pointed out that "the purely prospective judicial opinion does not have
all the objectionable characteristics of an advisory opinion.' '317 The issue
that the court decides in such a case, observes Schaefer, "has not been
sent to it by a doubting legislature, perhaps seeking to avoid its own responsibilities. It has arisen in an actual case, brought before the court by adver' 31
sary parties in the ordinary course of litigation.
A purely prospective ruling, however, recognizes Justice Schaefer,
is subject to other objections:
Since the new rule it announces has no effect whatsoever upon
the parties to the case, it is technically dictum and so, theoretically
at least, it is not binding upon other courts or even, in future
cases, upon the court that announces it. . . . The practical
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 22.
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (overruling United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)).
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (Chimel); Desist v. United States,

394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Katz).
314. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 11.5(b), at 689.
315. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV.
1557, 1615 (1975).
316. Id.
317. Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22.
318. Id.
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criticism that litigants will not urge the overruling of undesirable
precedents if their success will bring no tangible reward is important. It is by no means a complete answer to point to the
institutional litigant in civil cases. And in criminal cases a public
defender represents an individual defendant and can hardly
ethically advocate a result that will not benefit his client.
• ..Another difficulty with a purely prospective overruling
[,although it] has not been recognized in judicial opinions,...
is the psychological fact that the dissatisfaction with the existing
rule that is strong enough to produce an overruling decision is
enough to produce a tangible result in the
usually also strong
3 19
case at hand.
Dean Beytagh, however, is not impressed with the argument that
pure prospectivity might destroy the incentive to challenge existing constitutional rules. In the common multiple-issue criminal case "counsel
makes every argument he can that has a modicum of substance, including
some that challenge existing rules.' "320 Moreover, even assuming singleissue criminal cases in which any new rule would predictably be applied
purely prospectively, it is still likely, maintains Beytagh, that constitutional issues pertinent to the case will be raised:
Institutional litigants are interested in having the law changed
for the benefit of future cases even though the old rule will be
applied in the law-changing decision, and much of the legal
representation of criminal defendants is institutional in character.
A public defender's office, for example, would have considerable
incentive to seek a change in the constitutional rules even though
321
the benefit would accrue only to those involved in later cases.
Beytagh may be right, but I find more persuasive the counterarguments of two commentators who have spent most of their professional
lives in a public defender's office:
First, any single new development in fourth amendment law is
likely to require the litigation of a large number of cases that
present the issue. This would far exceed the pool of cases available
to any one attorney or office. Second, public defenders are
notoriously overworked and do not have time to plan the development of fourth amendment law or to litigate every marginal case
raising a key point of law in the hope of ultimately changing
the law. Third, personnel changes and turn-over would make
the execution of any such strategy difficult at best. Finally,
changes in fourth amendment law do not have the kind of effect
319. Id. at 22-23.
320. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critiqueand a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV.
1557, 1613-14 (1975).
321. Id. at 1614.
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on the professional life of defense
lawyers that, for example,
322
liberalized discovery rules have.
I have not discussed the retroactivity/prospectivity issue and related
problems to the extent I have out of any desire to add to the voluminous
literature that already exists on the subject.3 23 I have done so, rather, in
an effort to show that the problems pervading this area, although they
might be termed "good faith" or "reasonable belief' problems, are
significantly different than those that arise-and arise much more
frequently-when a police officer misjudges his authority under well-settled
fourth amendment principles.
Whether, as in Payton, evidence obtained pursuant to a statute that
purports to authorize the very search or seizure in question224 (at least
when, at the time the challenged police action occurred, the statute reflected
prevailing law) should be admitted in the "first case" that holds the statute
unconstitutional or whether, more generally, a "change" in fourth amendment law can and should be applied purely prospectively, are what law
professors like to call "nice questions." Although the objections to such
a course of action are formidable, there is something to be said for applying a dramatic change in the law of search and seizure purely prospectively. (Whether Payton marked such a change is arguable. 325) For in such
322. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 451 n.494; see also 3 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 22, § 11.5(b), at 690 (questioning whether "[a]s a matter of both ethics and
practicality.. . a lawyer can or should be expected to divert a part of his oral and written
argumentation to a point which could be of no benefit to his present client"); Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Law and Time, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 56, 61 (1965) (recognition of even "a substantial possibility" of pure prospectivity
"will tend to deter counsel from advancing contentions involving novelty or ingenuity
and will lead them to focus on other aspects bf their cases").
323. See, e.g., Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Callfor the End of the Linkletter
Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 417 (1969); Johnson, Foreword:
Retroactivity in Retrospect, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1612 (1968); Mallamud, ProspectiveLimitation
and the Rights of the Accused, 56 IOwA L. REv. 321 (1970); Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court,
The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Law and Time, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schaefer,
The Control of "Sunbursts"." Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631
(1967); H. Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to ProfessorMishkin,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem
in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L. REV. 832 (1966).
324. This situation is to be contrasted with one in which the police rely on a substantive
statute (e.g., an abortion statute), later invalidated because it violates some constitutional
provision other than the fourth amendment. No tampering with the exclusionary rule is
necessary in such a situation, because if the police reasonably believe a person is violating
such a statute the arrest is based on probable cause. See supra note 292.
325. Although the Supreme Court decided as a general proposition that Payton did
not mark a "clear break with past" but only resolved an "unsettled" question, United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982), it is hard to answer this question without
specifying what "past" one is talking about-that is, what year the challenged police action occurred. In Johnson, which applied Payton retroactively to cases still pending on direct
review, the warrantless entry to effect an arrest occurred in May 1977. By that time the
question whether such police action violated the fourth amendment had been expressly
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instances it may be said that not only the particular officers in the case,
but the law enforcement profession as a whole acted quite "reasonably."
But these "nice questions" are a far cry from those that arise when an
officer did not have reasonable grounds to make an arrest under settled
precedents but "not too unreasonably" thought he did, or when an officer
insufficiently understood his authority to search under settled principlesthat is, a reasonably discreet and prudent officer "in his shoes" would
not have conducted the search, but this particular officer "understandably misunderstood" his authority to search.
Assuming that the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the
vehicle for establishing the new rule must or should get the benefit of it,
(a) whether the new rule should apply only to searches and seizures that
take place after the date of the decision, as the Court has repeatedly held
with respect to decisions marking "a clear break with the past";

326

or

(b) whether a case "resolving unsettled fourth amendment questions"
should be "applied retroactively" to all convictions not yet final at the
time the case was handed down, as the Court recently told us in United
States v. Johnson;327 or (c) whether "the retroactive reach" of a case resolv-

ing "unsettled questions" should even extend to "those cases that still
may raise Fourth Amendment issues on collateral attack ' 32 are also "nice
left open in four Supreme Court opinions. &e id. at 551. Moreover, by that time
a goodly number of state and federal courts had come around to the view that such police
action was unconstitutional. See cases cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 575
nn.3-4 (1980).
Payton did not constitute a "clear break" or "sharp break" in the law, theJohnson Court
told us, because it did not overrule a past precedent of the Court or "disapprove[] a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases," or "overturn[] a longstanding
and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous
body of lower court authority has expressly approved." Id. at 551.
By the time the Payton case was decided, and probably by the time the police action
in Johnson took place, the question whether the police could make a warrantless entry into
an arrestee's home had become "unsettled," but at the time the challenged police action
occurred in the Payton case itself, back inJanuary 1970, the overwhelming weight of statutory
and lower court authority, if not "a near-unanimous body of lower court authority,"
did approve such police conduct. &e supra text accompanying notes 298-302.
Moreover, as pointed out in Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 1,Johnson's "near-unanimity" requirement "is new, and theJohnson opinion offers no justification for its imposition." Id. at 10. Thus, if the Supreme Court had held
in a different 1980 case that warrantless entries into homes to effect arrests were unconstitutional and Payton had been the "second case," a forceful argument could be made that
the new rule would mark a "clear break" in the law as the law existed in January 1970. See id.
It should also be noted that the federal agents whose action was challenged in Johnson
did not rely on any procedural statute, but the police in Payton did. They relied on an
1881 state statute that purported to authorize the very police conduct at issue.
326. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-54 (1982), quoted in part in supra
note 325; 3 W. LAFAVE, supranote 22, § 11.5(a), at 685; id. § 11.5(b), at 690-91; id. at
237-40 (Supp. 1983); Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61
VA. L. REV. 1557, 1571, 1576-77, 1592-95 (1975).
327. 457 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1982), discussed in supra note 325.
328. See id. at 562. Because Johnson arose on direct review the Court saw no need
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questions." Again, however, although not wholly unrelated to the "good
faith" proposal, they raise very different questions than those presented
in the bulk of cases most likely to be affected by a "good faith" or
"reasonable belief" modification of the exclusionary rule-those in which
officers fail to apply or misapply relatively clear or settled fourth amendment guidelines and their mistakes are not the mistakes of "reasonable
men," as that term has traditionally been defined in the law of search
and seizure. 32 9 (Of course, if the officers' mistakes were the mistakes of
"reasonable men," as that term has traditionally been defined, they would
not need the additional help provided by a "good faith" or "reasonable
belief" modification of the exclusionary rule.)
To the extent that United States v.Johnson does bear on the proposed
"good faith" or "reasonable belief" test, it provides some aid and comfort to those resisting such a test. For in Johnson the government argued,
as the Court described it, that "new Fourth Amendment rules must be
denied retroactive effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing
constitutional norms. ' 330 Furthermore, the government argued, retroactive application of a decision such as Payton resolving an unsettled question of fourth amendment law, even to cases pending on direct review,
"would not serve the policies underlying the exclusionary rule." ' 331 But

a 5-4 majority, per Justice Blackmun, responded:
If, as the government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled
Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then,
in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior. Official
awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would
be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth
Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be excluded only
in the one case definitely resolving the unsettled question. Failure
to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings
would "encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain
purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided
3

approach."

32

The Court's response to the government's contention inJohnson seems
equally applicable to arguments for a "good faith" or "reasonable belief"
to address this question. See id. The Court's apparent reservation of this question is quite
surprising, "for the entire purpose of the Linkletter direct appeal approach was to exclude
cases coming before the court on collateral attack." Schaefer, ProspectiveRulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14.
329. See supra note 291; see also supra notes 245-46.

330.
331.
332.

457 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas,

J., dissenting)) (emphasis original).
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test in other contexts. "If, as the Court held [in Johnson], [the policies
underlying the exclusionary rule] are served by requiring exclusion when
police officers make a mistake while acting in a constitutional 'gray area,' "
points out former Justice Stewart, "it is clear that the same policies are
served when officers act unconstitutionally [albeit 'understandably'] by
engaging in conduct that is prohibited under settled fourth amendment

precedent.' 33
Although the Court has indicated otherwise, 334 it may well be that
when as in Payton (but unlike the situation in Johnson) the police act pursuant to a statute that purports to authorize the very police conduct at
issue, especially a longstanding statute reflecting the prevailing law at the
time, a change in the fourth amendment law should not be applied
retroactively.3 35 But I do not believe, as Justice White seems to think,
faith' or
that this view "leads inexorably to the more general ['good
'reasonable belief] modification of the exclusionary rule. '"336
The New York officer who-ten years before the Supreme Court's
decision in Payton-conducted a warrantless entry of a suspect's home pursuant to an 1881 statute that purported to authorize the very practice he
337
in a very difengaged in, "reasonably believed" he was acting lawfully
ferent sense than an officer who "reasonably" searches on the basis of
circumstances that would not have led a "reasonably discreet and prudent" officer to search.3 38 When an officer acts in conformity with the
fourth amendment's requirements as they existed at the time of the search
only to see those requirements change dramatically because of a judicial
decision rendered after the event, the police department as a whole-let
alone the individual officer-has done all that can reasonably be expected
of it. When, on the other hand, an officer "reasonably" or "understandably" thought he had adequate grounds to arrest only to learn that the
totality of circumstances did not add up to even "a substantial chance
of criminal activity, 339 an incorrectly or inadequately trained officer may
have done all that could reasonably be expected of him, but those who
run the police department certainly have not.
Nothing useful is to be gained by lumping significantly different types
of fourth amendment violations together under the rubric of "good faith"
or "reasonable belief." Some fourth amendment violations are a good
deal more "reasonable" or "understandable"-or forgivable or
333. Stewart, supra note 173, at 1402-03.
334. See supra note 303.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 298-302; see also supra note 325. It may even
be, although there are strong objections to such a course of action, see supra text accompanying notes 303-22, that the invalidation of such a statute should be applied purely
prospectively.
336. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2341 n.12 (White, J., concurring).

337.

Cf. id.

338.
339.

See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 252.
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unavoidable-than others. Some, such as the warrantless entry that occurred in the Payton circumstances, stir sympathy and may even call for
more relief than the Court has heretofore rendered. Others should leave
us unmoved.
An opponent of the "good faith" or "reasonable belief" test should
not lightly dismiss the officer who had a hoary judicial precedent or procedural statute suddenly shot out from under him by assuring him that
the fourth amendment allows ample room for mistakes. (Not always.) A
proponent of the "good faith" or "reasonable belief" test, on the other
hand, should not use some of the very difficult but relatively rare situations that arise in the retroactivity/prospectivity cases as "loss leaders"
to attract support for a softening of the exclusionary rule across the board.
V.

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS: "GOOD FAITH" AND

"COST-BENEFIT" ANALYSIS
Part II of Justice White's concurring opinion in Gates is a powerful
brief for adopting a "reasonable, good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule. Although he would eliminate the "subjective element" of the proposed exception and "measure the reasonableness of a particular search
or seizure only by objective standards, 1'340 and although he would continue to apply the exclusionary rule "when it is plainly evident that a
magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant," 3 41Justice White's
arguments seem to outrun his conclusions.
If Justice White "would not presume that a modification of the exclusionary rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their responsibility to apply
the law,' '342 why presume that abolition of the rule would lead them to
do so? If the Court "has never set forth a rationale for applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search
warrant, "43 and if, as Justice White believes, "the exclusionary rule was
adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of
magistrates and judges,' '4 why exclude any evidence obtained pursuant
to a judicially issued search warrant?
Again, if, as Justice 'White seems convinced, "when officers perform their tasks in the good-faith belief [as measured by objective standards] that their action comported with constitutional requirements, the
deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is so minimal, if not non-existent,
that the balance clearly favors the rule's modifications, 3 45 why is this
not also the case when the officer believes in complete good faith that his
action comports with constitutional requirements? As Justice White has
noted elsewhere, "when the officer is convinced that he has probable cause
103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 2345 (White, J., concurring).
342. Id. (White, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 2344 (White, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 2345 (White, J., concurring).
345. Id. at 2344 (White, J., concurring).
340.
341.
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' 346
to arrest he will very likely make the arrest."
Justice White seeks only a modification of the exclusionary rule. He
"would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor Mapp v. Ohio.' 3 4 7 But
if some of the views Justice White advances and builds upon in Gates are
correct, why not overrule those landmark cases? Here, too, as I shall try
to show, Justice White's arguments seem to outrun his limited objective.
In urging a modification of the exclusionary rule, Justice White relied
in part on United States v. Calandra,3 48 "[p]erhaps the most significant post' 349
In ruling that
Mapp decision on the scope of the exclusionary rule."
a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on the ground
that they are based on the fruits of an unlawful search, the CalandraCourt,
per Justice Powell, characterized the exclusionary rule as "a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved. ' 350 As in the case with any remedial device, observed
Justice Powell, the rule's application "has been restricted to those areas
3
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.' '
Thus, whether grand jury questions based on evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment should be proscribed "present[ed] a question,
not of rights, but of remedies' " 352-a question to be answered by weighing
the "potenthe "potential injury" to the functions of the grand jury against
35 3
tial benefits" of the exclusionary rule in this context.
I share the Calandradissenters' way of thinking about the exclusionary
rule. I believe that the goals "uppermost in the minds of the framers of

346. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). As Judge Rubin, who opposes a "reasonable, good faith" modification of the

exclusionary rule, has pointed out in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring), if, as a majority of the Fifth Circuit maintains,

an officer will not be deterred from an unlawful search if he does not know that it is unlawful,
it seems needless to require that his subjective belief also be objectively reasonable: "A

policeman who is [acting] in complete subjective good faith is unlikely to stop and ask
himself, 'Am I also reasonable?' " Id. at 850 n.4.
347. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting), referring to Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which adopted the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which imposed the federal exclusionary

rule on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process. In Gates, Justice White
seems to reaffirm the position he set forth in Stone. See 103 S. Ct. at 2336 (White, J.,
concurring).
348. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
349. Stewart, supra note 173, at 1390. The importance of Calandrais underscored in
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1975). For
extensive criticism of the case, see Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974); see also Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis " Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 638-43 (1983).

350. 414 U.S. at 348.
351.

Id., quoted with approval in Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2340 (White, J., concurring).

352.
353.

414 U.S. at 354.
See id. at 349.
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the rule" were "enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership
in official lawlessness" and "assuring the people . .. that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in government. "354 Nowhere in
the foundational Weeks case is the exclusionary rule called a "remedy"
and nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion, or even mention, of
the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule versus the effectiveness of tort
remedies, internal self-discipline, or other alternatives. Although few would
suspect this from Calandra and other recent majority opinions of the
Supreme Court, the Weeks opinion "contains no language that expressly
justifies the rule by reference to a supposed deterrent effect on police
officials.'

55

Nor, as various commentators have noted 3 56 was the idea of deterrence expressed for the next thirty-five years-the interim between Weeks
and the year of Wolf v. Colorado.357 As I recently observed elsewhere:
The Court that decided Weeks and the Courts that adhered to
its doctrine in subsequent decades may have expected, or at least
hoped, that law enforcement officials would not be so "impervious, uncaring or ignorant of the search and seizure rules hammered out in our courts" as to be unaffected by them-no doubt
the Court had the same expectations, or at least hopes, about
local public school officials when it decided Brown v. Board of
Education-but there is no suggestion in Weeks or in the search
and seizure cases handed down over the next thirty-five years
on proof that it is
that the exclusionary rule's survival depends
58
significantly influencing police behavior.

354. Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
355.

F. Allen, TheJudicialQuestfor PenalJustice:The Warren Courtand the CriminalCases,

1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 536 n.90.
356. See Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in ConstitutionalDemocracy,
23 How. L.J. 299, 302-07 (1980); McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, the ExclusionaryRule and the Right

of Privacy, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 327, 330 (1973); Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at
379-80.
357. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
358. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the ExclusionaryRule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather
than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 598-600 (1983) (emphasis
original); see also id. at 599 n.211 (quoting Letter from Judge Herbert Stern to Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, May 12, 1982, reprinted in THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE BILLS:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 806-08 (1982)):

I have spent my entire career working within the criminal justice system....
There is no doubt in my mind that the exclusionary rule does in fact deter law
enforcement misconduct at every level. It is simply incredible to suggest that
the police, the FBI, the District Attorney and the United States Attorney are
impervious, uncaring or ignorant of the search and seizure rules hammered out
in our courts. It is, I think, a slander to suggest that our law enforcement
authorities are either so stupid or uncaring that they are unaffected or-if you

will-undeterred by what the courts say they must do, and what they must not do.
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The kind of "cost-benefit" analysis of the exclusionary rule that the
Court has employed in recent years does support a "good faith" or
"reasonable belief" modification of the exclusionary rule, but it also
threatens the very life of the rule itself. In his Gates concurrence Justice
White (a) recalls that Calandraand its progeny 35 9 reflect the view that "the
exclusion of evidence is not a personal constitutional right but a remedy,
which, like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of
its imposition";360 (b) maintains that "any rule of evidence that denies
the jury access to clearly probative and reliable evidence must bear a heavy
burden ofjustification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances
in which it will pay its way by deterring official lawlessness";361 and then
(c) reports that "[t]he deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has never
been established by empirical evidence, despite repeated attempts.' '362 But
if all this is so, why stop with only a modification of the exclusionary rule?
Why not abolish the rule altogether?
In the twenty-five years I have written about the exclusionary rule,
I have tried to show, even before I ever heard of the term, how judicial
rulings significantly affect
police conduct by means of what is now called
"systemic deterrence." 3 63 But one of the troubles with the cost-benefit
analysis of the exclusionary rule (from the vantage point of the rule's
defenders at any rate) is that the empirical terrain favors the rule's critics,
"who through the guerilla warfare of pointing to sporadic incidents, can
create the dataless impression that the rule fails to deter police
359. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may
be used to impeach not only direct testimony of defendant but also statements first elicited
from him on cross-examination); United States v. Geccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusionary rule "should be invoked with much greater reluctance" when defense seeks to
suppress live-witness testimony rather than an inanimate object); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on searchand-seizure grounds unless denied opportunity for "full and fair litigation" of claim in
state courts); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (rule's deterrent purpose would
not be served by excluding evidence, obtained illegally by state police, from federal civil
tax proceedings).
As for Calandra'sancestry, it relied on Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
(benefits of allowing defendants "standing" to challenge evidence seized in violation of
third party's constitutional rights outweighed by further encroachment upon public interest in suppressing crime); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (even
when government has intentionally manipulated "standing" requirement by deliberately
violating fourth amendment rights of third party in order to obtain evidence against defendant, federal court may not use its supervisory power to exclude evidence).
360. 103 S. Ct. at 2342 (White, J., concurring).
361. Id. (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 2343 (White, J., concurring).
363. See Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories, " 53
J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171, 179-81, 192 (1962); Kamisar, Wolf and
Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV.

1083, 1152-58 (1959); see also Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in HistoricalPerspective: The
Struggle to Make the FourthAmendment More Than "An Empty Blessing, ""62 JUDICATURE 337,
347-50 (1979); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 69-73 (1978).
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misconduct." 3 6 4 "The costs of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent; its benefits are only conjectural. ' 365 "[I]t is never easy to prove
a negative" 3 66 and "[p]olice compliance with the exclusionary rule prodirectly observable-it consists of not conduces a non-event which is ' not
367
search."
illegal
an
ducting
In his Gates concurrence, Justice White insists that the exclusionary
rule should bear "a heavy burden of justification" and that it should be
limited to the circumstances in which "it will pay its way by deterring official
lawlessness. "368 But one of the leading empiricists in the area, political
scientist Bradley Canon, has recently concluded that this is too great a
burden for the exclusionary rule to bear:
There is no way to demonstrate that the rule works or that it
does not work . . . or even that it works 35 % of the time or
68 % or whatever. . . . Those who want rigorous proof must
be disappointed, unless, of course, they have assigned the burden
36 9
of proof to their opponents. Then they will be delighted.
Another problem with the "deterrence" rationale of the exclusionary
rule and its concomitant "interest-balancing" -and a more fundamental
one, I think-is that, as C(alandra and other cases demonstrate370
while the simple structure of that rhetoric [of deterrence] is
scientific-it is an inquiry into those facts that define the costs
and benefits that determine the result-the inquiry can never
be performed in an adequate way, and the reality thus is that
the decision must rest not upon those grounds, but upon prior
37 1
dispositions or unarticulated intuitions that are never justified.
364. Canon, Ideology and Re2lity in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative
Argument for Its Retention, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 559, 564 (1982).
365. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 182, at 394.
366. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
367. A. Morris, The Exclusicnary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,
57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 653 (1982).
368. See supra text accompanying note 361.
369. Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative
Argumentfor Its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 559,572 (1982); seealso id. at 564; RogerDworkin,
Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329,
332-33 (1973); A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis
of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 653 (1982); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 716 (1970); Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and
the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 365-68 (1980); Critique, On

the Limitations of EmpiricalEvaluaionsof the Exclusionary Rule: A Critiqueof the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740, 758-64 (1974).
370. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 63345 (1983).

371. J. B. White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1273, 1282 (1983); see also Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565,634, 638,

642-50 (1983). Continues Professor White:
The language of "workability" and social planning obscures or denies the respon-
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How could it be otherwise? How does one go about deciding whether
the exclusionary rule "pays its way" in a particular setting without giving free play to one's ideas of policy? How does one "price" the beliefs,
values, and ideals in the fourth amendment as if they were consumer
benefits?
If one must "balance" the "competing interests," how does one do
so without measuring imponderables and comparing incommensurables?
How does one balance "privacy" or "individual liberty" against the interest in suppressing crime, or "law and order"? Since "privacy" or "individual liberty" and "efficiency" in suppressing crime are different kinds
of interests, how can they be compared quantitatively unless the court has
"some standard independent of both to which they can be referred' '?372
If the standard is not to be the fourth amendment-which embodies the
judgment that protecting all citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures outweighs society's interest in apprehending and convicting
criminals-then what is it to be?373

Finally, if not even the victim of a fourth amendment violation has
a "constitutional right" to exclude the evidence-if the use of such evidence
"presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies" 37 4-why should the
courts "balance" the "costs" and the "benefits"? Does our system of
government not "provide a good reason for leaving that decision to more
democratic institutions' ?37 If the exclusionary rule's application turns
376
on a "pragmatic analysis of [its] usefulness in a particular context,
377
why not "replace judicial with legislative pragmatism' ?

sibility of the individual judge for the decision he or she is making in the case,
by giving it a false scientific form; this, in turn, denies all of us the benefits
of a judicial process in which judges acknowledge their ultimately personal responsibility for their decision, which they are obliged to justify in their opinions,
and for which it is their duty to educate their minds by the experience of argument and thought.
J.B. White, supra, at 1282-83.
372. Cf Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 729, 749 (1963) (ad hoc balancing process cannot promote impartiality of results).
See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 13, 133, 139-40, 191-95, 200 (1977).
373. Cf Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 729, 749 (1963) (balancing process applied without impartial rule cannot promote
impartial results, nor can it earn public confidence). See also Linde, Judges, Critics, and
the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 240-42 (1972).
374. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
375. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 140 (1977).

376.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976) (Powell, J.); see supra note 359.

377. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 241 (1972). If
one accepts the Calandramajority's way of thinking about the exclusionary rule then, as
Professor Monaghan pointed out a decade ago, the great constitutional debate becomes

simply a dispute over a policy issue "that turns largely on an evaluation of debatable
legislative facts, namely, the most effective way to deter police misconduct." Monaghan,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1975).
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After all, "[t]he balancing of conflicting interests would seem to be
inherently a legislative question for which the judicial process is very illadapted. It requires evaluating vast arrays of facts of a kind which are
not to be found in the ordinary judicial record-and which will be extremely difficult for the litigants to put there." 378 Indeed, after a careful
examination of the relevant literature, theJanis Court concluded that each
empirical study of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect "in its own way,
appears to be flawed." 379 Thus, the Court found itself "in no better position" than it had been sixteen years earlier when it had voiced grave doubts
that "conclusive factual data [on the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect]
could ever be assembled." 3 80
I have no doubt that some members of the bench and bar sincerely
believe that a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" modification of the
exclusionary rule will "make it more acceptable and hence more lasting."381
But I think not. I think such a modification of the rule will make it look
still less like a constitutional rule and bring its ultimate demise one step
closer.
Many of the rule's critics will never rest until they succeed in stamping it out completely. Adoption of a "good faith" or "reasonable belief"
exception will not lead them to discontinue their "war of attrition" against
the rule. Indeed, it may only embolden them to launch a final assault.
Ever since the "deterrence" rationale and its concomitant "interestbalancing" bloomed in the 1974 Calandra case, the exclusionary rule has
been sitting under a Sword of Damocles. There it will remain until the
rule no longer rests on an empirical proposition but on a principled basis,
as it did originally and for much of its life.
"[W]hen deterrence-rather than the protection of the defendant's
right to due process at the hand of the state that seeks to convict himbecomes the basis for exclusion, that shift," Professor James B. White
has noted, "generates an enormous pressure for reduction of the rule:
in each case the real cost of the possible release of a guilty defendant is
weighed against the merely contingent advantage of the marginal deterrent impact of exclusion in a diffuse and unknown future." 382 Not surprisingly, therefore, in the last decade the Court's "balancing of competing interests"-in an empirical fog-has led to the conclusion in various
378. Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1443-44 (1962).
Professor James B. White has gone so far as to say that the "workability" or "deterrence" approach to the exclusionary rule "involves the Court in a set of judgments that

it is incompetent to make, and avoids those more particular judgments that it is its duty
to make." J. B. White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionay Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv.
1273, 1283 (1983).

379. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1976); see supra note 359.
380. 428 U.S. at 453 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)).
381. Kaplan, The Limits of the ExclusionaryRule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1045 (1974).
382. J. B. White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1273, 1281 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 364-67.
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"peripheral"

615

or "collateral" settings that the exclusionary rule's
if any, would be outweighed by the "costs" it imposes on

"benefits,"
383
society.
But if the Court were to adopt a "good-faith" exception because it
was unpersuaded that the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule
outweigh the societal costs when the police perform their tasks in the goodfaith belief (objectively measured or otherwise) that their action comported
with constitutional requirements, the decision would be more significant
than Calandraor any of its progeny. For such a decision would take a goodsized bite out of the rule in its central application-theprosecutor's case-inchief against the victim of a fourth amendment violation. And it would
fray the thread that holds the cost-benefit sword over the exclusionary
rule itself.
383.

See supra text accompanying notes 348-53 (discussion of Calandra);supra note 359.
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